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EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP
RECONSIDERED: RESULTS OF THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY TURN
ROGER C. PARK*
MICHAEL J. SAKS **
Abstract: Evidence scholarship has developed a permanent interdisci-
plinary aspect, involving a variety of different disciplinary themes.
These include: the psychology of witnesses and factfinders, forensic sci-
ence, theories of probability and proof, feminist perspectives on evi-
dence law, and the law and economics perspective. After first assessing
the status of traditional doctrinal scholarship, we review each of the ma-
jor interdisciplinary braids, compare them, and evaluate their relative
contributions. We conclude by developing a thesis about the utility of
different types of evidence scholarship, arguing that interdisciplinary
evidence scholarship is more promising and useful to the extent that it
helps to explain or advance the truth-seeking function of trials, rather
than to posit or seek extrinsic effects of rules that traditionally have
been understood as protecting the accuracy of verdicts.
INTRODUCTION
In this article, we examine the changing field of evidence schol-
arship, which has become decidedly interdisciplinary. The impor-
tance of these endeavors is bound to the importance of evidence law:
the rules by which we adjudicate facts are as important as the inter-
pretation of substantive law, and perhaps more so.I While each of
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California Hastings College of the Law. J.D., Harvard Law School.
For their helpful comments on earlier drafts, the authors thank Professors Ronald Al-
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David Kaye, Dale Nance, Aviva Orenstein, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Sanchirico, Peter Till-
ers, and Joan Williams.
** Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Arizona State University; Ph.D., Ohio
State University; M.S.L., Yale Law School.
1 See William Twining, Recent Trends in Evidence Scholarship, in PROCEEDINGS OE THE
FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE
13, 15-16 (J.F. Nijboer & J.M. Reijntjes eds., 1997); WILLIAM TWINING, Taking Facts Seri-
ously, in RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 12, 23 (1990); cf. John D. Jackson,
Modern Trends in Evidence Scholarship: Is All Rosy in the Garden?, 21 QUINNIPIAC L REV. 893,
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those interdisciplinary domains has its own literature, wherein issues
of relevance to that interdisciplinary intersection are addressed and
debated, the present Article is the first to consider all of the major
strains, compare them, and evaluate the comparative contribution of
the different approaches. 2
We start with an assessment of the status and value of traditional
doctrinal scholarship (Part I). We then review interdisciplinary inquir-
ies into the psychology of witnesses and factfinders (Part II), forensic
science (Part III), theories of probability and proof (Part IV), the im-
plications of feminism for evidence law (Part V), and the contribu-
tions of the law and economics perspective (Part VI). In the process,
we develop a thesis about the utility of different types of evidence
scholarship; namely, interdisciplinary evidence scholarship is more
promising and useful to the extent that it helps to explain or advance
the truth-seeking functions of trials, rather than to posit or seek ex-
trinsic effects from rules that traditionally have been understood as
protecting the accuracy of verdicts. 3
I. DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP ON EVIDENCE
Evidence scholarship has a distinguished history. It attracted one
of the great minds of the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham, whose
evidence writings, after being edited by John Stuart Mill, were pub-
lished in 1827 in a five-volume treatise entitled Rationale of Judicial
Evidence. 4
 Bentham's treatise urged radical utilitarian reform to the
906 (2003) (arguing that modern evidence scholarship has embraced interdisciplinary
approaches within the rationalist tradition).
2
 For other treatments, see authorities cited supra note 1, and Ronald J. Allen & Brian
Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (2001)
(supporting the usefulness of social epistemology to the study of evidence); Richard Lem-
pert, The Economic Analysis' of Evidence Law: Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1623
(2001) (evaluating the intersection of evidence and economics and dismissing the rele-
vance of economics to the field of evidence); Roger C. Park, Grand Perspectives on Evidence
Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 2055, 2079 (2001) (favoring empirical legal scholarship over legal epis-
temology or legal economics); Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1713, 1721 (2001) (supporting the importance of economics to evidence law).
3
 In other words, we extend to the interdisciplinary realm Bentham's vision of trial fact
finding. Bentham saw the "direct end" of legal procedure to be "rectitude of decision" and
the "collateral ends" to be "the avoidance of unnecessary delay, vexation, and expense." 1
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 34 (London, Hunt & Clark 1827).
We agree with this proposition, though we recognize that in exceptional circumstances
goals such as protection of privacy should be considered in framing evidence law. For a
summary of Bentham's views, see WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM
AND WIGMORE 27-100 (1985).
' BENTHAM, supra note 3.
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misguided evidence rules of the time. Despite its prevailing tone of
sarcasm and ridicule, Bentham's treatise seems to have been quite ef-
fective in speeding the abolition of its principal targets, such as rules
disqualifying witnesses for interest. 5
 The early twentieth century
brought an evidence treatise that was hailed by eminent scholars as
the best written on any subject8—john Henry Wigmore's monumen-
tal and enormously influential Evidence in Trials at Common Law col-
lected and systematized virtually all of the common law of evidence.?
Both works had great influence in resolving logical contradictions,
making evidence doctrine more coherent, and reforming archaic
rules that compelled judges to make senseless rulings that led to un-
just results.
Despite the wide-ranging interests of Bentham and Wigmore,
much of their writing on evidence consisted of what would now be
called doctrinal scholarship. Doctrinal scholarship focuses on analyz-
ing and synthesizing rules and urging that they be reconceptualized
or otherwise improved. 8 That is not to say that it is formal or purely
analytic. Doctrinal scholarship long has had a prescriptive element. Its
practitioners have sought to improve the law and have been con-
cerned with the social consequences of law. But their policy analysis
5 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 8, at 611 (Tillers
rev. 1983). Wigmore stated:
Mature experience constantly inclines us to believe that the best results on
human action are seldom accomplished by sarcasm and invective.... But
Bentham's case must always stand out as a proof that sometimes the contrary
is true—if conditions are meet. No one can say how long our law might have
waited for regeneration if Bentham's diatribes had not lashed the legal com-
munity into a sense of its shortcomings.
Id.
6 Joseph Beale wrote, "It is hardly too much to say that this is the most complete and
exhaustive treatise on a single branch of our law that has ever been written." J.H. Beale,
Book Review, 18 HARV. L. REV. 478, 478 (1905) (reviewing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1905)). Of the third
edition, Edmund Morgan wrote: "Not only is this the best, by far the best, treatise on the
Law of Evidence, it is also the best work ever produced on any comparable division of An-
glo-American Law." Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 20 B.U. L. REV. 776, 793 (1940)
(footnote omitted) {reviewing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIMS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940)). William Twining has noted that "one of
the difficulties of debating with Wigmore was that, so great was his influence, once he had
perpetrated a doctrine on the basis of little or no authority, precedents would soon follow
to fill the gap." TWINING, supra note 3, at 111.
7 WIGMORE, supra note 5.
For examples of doctrinal scholarship and discussion of its usefulness, see Roger C.
Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN, L. REV. 849, 859-71 (1991).
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has rested mainly on history, experience, and fireside inductions 9—
not on knowledge of the scholarly literatures of disciplines outside the
law that address many of evidence law's concerns.
In leading law reviews, there has been a steep decline in doctrinal
scholarship on evidence law. Examination of the top continuously-
published journals shows a dramatic reduction in the proportion of
pages devoted to such scholarship. 10 At the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, doctrinal articles constituted 93% of the evidence articles in
these journals. By mid-century that percentage had fallen to 79%, and
by century's end only 20% of evidence articles were doctrinal. Doc-
trinal inquiries—that is, analyses of the rules themselves, their coher-
ence, their organization, their emergence and disappearance—have
been replaced by inquiries of other kinds." These newer inquiries
seek to cross law with some other discipline.
"Fireside inductions," a term coined by the psychologist Paul Mee h l, describes infer-
ences and deductions we draw from everyday experience, from introspection, from anec-
dotal evidence, and from culturally transmitted ideas, rather than from rigorous, system-
atic inquiry. Paul Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical
Psychologist, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 65, 65-66 (1971).
A "doctrinal" article is one that describes rules of law and synthesizes them. It may
also suggest improvements or reforms. Its use of information from other disciplines is
ancillary. The first author sampled evidence articles from three periods approximately fifty
years apart to assess the relative frequency of doctrinal articles on evidence versus other
kinds of evidence scholarship. To reduce the number of articles to be read, the inquiry was
limited to often-cited American law reviews that were published under the same name in
all three periods. Examination of citation studies conducted in 1930 and 1996 disclosed
ten law journals that appeared among the top twenty in both studies. See Scott Finet, The
Most Frequently Cited Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals, 9 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 227,
229 tb1.1 (1989) (presenting material from Douglas B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which
the Law Review Contributes to the Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (1930)); James
Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 CHI: KENT L.
REv. 781, 789 tbl.2 (1996). Those were the Harvard Law Review, Yak Law journal, Michigan
Law Review, Columbia Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Virginia Law Review,
Cahfornia Law Review, New York University Law Review, Cornell Law Quarterly/Law Review, and
Minnesota Law Review. Research assistants compiled a list of evidence articles from these
journals at approximately fifty-year intervals. The exact dates were chosen for index-
searching convenience. A search for evidence articles was made in the Index to Legal Peri-
odicals and the tables of contents of the listed journals. The articles were read and catego-
rized as doctrinal treatments of evidence law or other types of evidence scholarship. (Some
articles were removed from consideration after they were determined not to be evidence
law articles.)
11 This certainly is the shared perception of evidence scholars themselves. See Richard
Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, in PROBABILITY AND
INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM 61, 61-62
(Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988).
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That does not mean that doctrinal scholarship is dying out.
Though it is true that, with impbrtant exceptions, 12 it is becoming less
common in elite journals, it flourishes more than ever in treatises"
and there is still ample space for it in journals due to the sheer prolif-
eration of law reviews." Though the change in the proportion of doc-
trinal and interdisciplinary evidence scholarship in often-cited jour-
nals is striking, in absolute terms there is still plenty to go around,
perhaps more pages than in earlier periods.
It is clear, however, that doctrinal evidence scholarship is less of-
ten published in elite journals, less respected among top scholars, and
less rewarded as a career choice than in earlier times." What accounts
for this shift in emphasis? There are several reasons. Some of them
are not limited to evidence scholarship, but common to all forms of
legal scholarship. For example, the realist perspective has triumphed,
and hence there is more emphasis on considering consequences and
discovering social facts. Law schools are more inclined to hire faculty
with advanced degrees in other fields. There have been well-financed
attempts to spread the law and economics perspective."
12 See generally Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial•1n Testimony, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1171 (2002) (primarily doctrinal, with incidental citation to empirical work);
Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 Mimi. L. REV. 1063
(1999) (doctrinal analysis of the right to present witnesses). See also the recent blossoming
of doctrinal discussion about Crawford v. Washington, infra note 22.
15 A count supervised by one of the authors of this article indicates that there were
twenty-three doctrinal texts and treatises on evidence law in print in 1957-58 (25,416
pages), compared to 207 texts and treatises in 2001-02 (150,833 pages), a page increase of
593%. (Casebooks and commercial outlines were not counted.) The data collection was
accomplished by identifying doctrinal evidence books that were listed in the 1957 and
1958 editions of Law Books in Print (Glanville Publishers) and the 2001-02 edition of Books
in Print (Bowker). Books that were unfamiliar to the principal investigator were judged by
their titles. For the second period, page counting was not practical for some works, so the
investigators estimated page length based on the mean length of the volumes for which
data were available. These estimates counted for 26,232 of the 150,833 pages counted in
the second period.
14 See Michael J. Saks, Howard Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among
Lam Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship? A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One
Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353, 373-74 (1996). The authors found that there
were nearly twice as many "practical" articles in 1985 as in 1960, a period during which the
number of primary law reviews had nearly tripled. Id. at 373. The biggest change in con-
tent away from doctrinal scholarship occurred in the top quintile of law reviews (in terms
of prestige as measured by the size of the host law school's library). Id. at 374.
15 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33J. LEGAL Enuc. 437, 437 (1983) (treatise-like work no longer a credit to those
"competing on the leading edge of legal thought"). See generally Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987).
Lempert, supra note 2, at 1636-37.
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The decline of doctrinal scholarship on evidence also is related
to particular features of evidence law. Doctrinal scholarship thrives
when the law is plainly unjust, seriously confused, or rapidly changing.
Evidence law is not as foolish as it was in Bentham's time nor as disor-
ganized as it was in Wigmore's time. Moreover, on most topics, the
climate for reform is not as good as it was in the eras of Wigmore and
Bentham. The mildly radical reform attempted in Edmund Morgan's
Model Code of Evidence17
 failed completely, and today's judges and law-
yers seem generally satisfied with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
were largely a codification of common-law rules extant in the mid-
twentieth century. Finally, the confusion that existed in Wigmore's
time and before has been largely tamed by the Federal Rules, so there
is no enthusiasm for ground-breaking reclassifications. And, com-
pared to other fields, doctrinal change is infrequent. The Advisory
Committee has proven conservative in its role of proposing amend-
ments. Nor have the evidence rules that are primarily focused on
achieving accuracy attracted much congressional activity. 18
 Congress
tends to have a substantive agenda, and even the rules of privilege,
which attract the attention of interest groups and which are fre-
quently the subject of state-level legislation, have not attracted much
attention from Congress at the national level—at least not since the
disputes in the 1970s over the content of the newly codified Federal
Rules of Evidence.Ig
17
 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). Edmund M. Morgan, Professor at Harvard Law
School, was the Chief Reporter and wrote the foreword. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1-70 (1942).
18
 An arguable exception has occurred in the area of expert testimony, where concern
about the alleged litigation explosion" and the perceived impacts of tort judgments
against manufacturers on American competitiveness inspired efforts to codify and toughen
the Daubert rule. See Nancy S. Farrell, Comment, Congressional Action to Amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
13 .1. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 523, 543-51 (1997). This effort encouraged the Advi-
sory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence to propose its own codification in what
became the 2000 Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Fmn, R. Evil). 702
(amended 2000) advisory committee's note; Derek L. Mogck, Note, Are We There Yet? Refin-
ing the Test for Expert Testimony Through Daubert, Kumho Tire and Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, 33 CONN. L. REV. 303, 324-25 (2000). .
18
 The primary exception is the Crime Bill of 1994, which made an exception to the
ban on character evidence of other serious sex crimes by the alleged perpetrator in cases
charging sexual assault or child molestation. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2136-37 (codified as FED. R.
Evin. 413-415 at 28 U.S.C. app. (2000)). Whatever its merits, this change seems to have
been driven by a substantive agenda of making it easier to convict sexual predators. See
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EvioENcE•279-83 (3d ed. 2003). See
generally Katharine K Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law,
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The lack of doctrinal change has two effects. First, there are fewer
new developments to explain and critique; over time it becomes harder
to generate new ideas about old doctrine. Second, the fact that propos-
als for change tend to die discourages scholars from advocating
change. This discouragement is important because modern doctrinal
scholarship is prescriptive. While it was possible 100 years ago to pub-
lish an article that merely described and organized doctrine, 20 modern
doctrinal scholarship invariably makes the case for reform and im-
provement. 21 If reform is unlikely, there is less incentive to argue for
improvements. When change does occur—as when the Supreme Court
changed confrontation doctrine in its 2004 decision in Crawford u
Washington—an outpouring of doctrinal scholarship results. 22
The era of the great doctrinal analysts and treatise-writers can be
seen as a continuation of Bentham's project of eliminating artificial
distinctions and obstacles to free proof. Though current evidence law
may have anomalies, 23 they are not as striking as they were in Ben-
tham's time. One does not see judges straining against evidence rules
that they themselves consider to be unjust.
110 HARV. L REv. 563 (1997); James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on
Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95
(1994); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men! A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials,
49 HASTINGS L.J. 663 (1998); Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character
Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORD HAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995).
20 For an example of such an article, see generally David Torrance, Evidence of Character
in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 12 YALE L.J. 352 (1903).
21 See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 Minn. L.
REV. 1063, 1064-69 (1999).
22 A search using the term "Crawford v. Washington" yielded 204 citations in the
LEXIS ALLREV database on February 13, 2006. The citations include a symposium in
Volume 71 of the Brooklyn Law Review, introduced by Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and Be-
yond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past; Introduction, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 1 (2005), and several other articles by law professors in well-recognized law reviews.
See generally Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); Daniel J.
Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal Interest in the Wake of
Crawford, 105 Cotum. L. REv. 2409 (2005); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Craw-
ford, 91 VA. L. Rev. 747 (2005); Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57
STAN. L. REV. 569 (2004).
The rules about impeaching the character of witnesses are an example. See Richard
Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [RI Analysis and a Proposed Over-
haul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 passim (1991) (proposing revisions to the rules of character
impeachment); FL Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 867-68, 887-88 (1982) (arguing that prior
convictions should be excluded).
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Another possible reason that doctrinal evidence scholarship may
decline is that the trial is becoming more of a rarity." Evidence doc-
trine is most important in jury trials, where there are two decision-
makers—one a referee who screens the evidence, and the other a fac-
tfinder that weighs the merits. But if jury trials (or trials in general)
become less important, rules that have application mainly to the
courtroom become correspondingly less important. This may con-
tribute to the study of evidence as a topic, not of courtroom rules, but
of how to determine the truth.
That is not to say that evidence rules always will remain static. In-
deed, structural changes eventually might make the current rules obso-
lete. If Mirjan Damaika is right in thinking that the pillars of evidence
law are crumbling because of structural changes—a drift away from the
jury-centered time-concentrated adversarial model 25—then at some
point doctrinal rejuvenation might re-open the door to doctrinal analy-
sis. But if the rejuvenation comes, as Damatia predicted, because the
pillars of the exclusionary rules deteriorate, 26
 then the rules excluding
evidence will themselves become less important, an effect that is sure to
reduce the importance of scholarship describing them.
Doctrinal scholarship has some significant benefits. It produces
material that can be easily understood by lawyers and judges on the
basis of their law school training and that helps them in understand-
ing and systematizing the law. Judge Harry Edwards's eloquent com-
plaint that he finds little of use in elite law reviews suggests that jour-
nals may be losing readership among judges and policymakers, the
very people who are in the best position to systematize and improve
the law. 27
 But this service to the profession also can be accomplished
by producing interdisciplinary scholarship that is useful and accessi-
ble. And that seems to be what is happening.
On the whole, then, the increased amount and prestige of inter-
disciplinary scholarship is a welcome development because of the
value of functional approaches to the analysis and criticism of law.
Rules of law need to be assessed in light of their social impact. Light
24 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (exhaustively review-
ing the evidence on the trend toward fewer and fewer trials). See also the entire issue of
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies in which Galanter's article appears, which is devoted to
the subject of the vanishing trial.
26
 See Mi nJAN R. DAMAgKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 125-42 (1997).
26 Id. at 149-52.
27 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992).
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from other fields can be an aid in assessing the impact of law, but
scholars in those other departments usually do not have the knowl-
edge of legal doctrine and legal institutions needed to deliver well-
crafted analyses. On the other side of the same coin, evidence schol-
ars have a special need to become conversant with those other disci-
plines as well as with doctrinal analysis. This is perhaps especially true
of the scientific method because both the social and natural sciences
are increasingly relevant to the law's attempt to reach accurate ver-
dicts. Et is hard to know whether a rule helps triers reach accurate re-
sults without knowing something about human reasoning, or to know
whether a forensic technique is valuable without knowing something
about the scientific method.
We turn next to an examination of the principal strains of con-
temporary interdisciplinary scholarship on evidence.
II. PSYCHOLOGY AND EVIDENCE
For obvious reasons, psychology is the most important of the in-
terdisciplinary threads that can be woven into evidence law scholarship.
Evidence law is much concerned with the abilities of witnesses to per-
ceive, to remember, and to report what they have observed. It is also
concerned with the abilities of jurors to comprehend, evaluate, and
draw inferences from the evidence presented to them, including their
ability to assess the sincerity of lay witnesses and to understand and not
be overwhelmed by expert witnesses. All of these are psychological is-
sues. By psychology we are referring to experimental psychology, cogni-
tive psychology, and social psychology, rather than to clinical psychol-
ogy. 28 Experimental studies that address topics such as memory,
perception, judgment, inference, decisions under conditions of uncer-
tainty, and jury behavior are plainly relevant to evidence law.
A. Early Examples
The history of experimental psychology and law has been one of
bursts of enthusiasm followed by periods of disenchantment. The first
scholar to look at the interconnections of law and psychology was
Hugo Miinsterberg, a Harvard professor who, in the course of invent-
28 These areas of psychology of primary interest to the scholarship of evidence law are
the offspring of the marriage of philosophy and experimental biology that took place in
the later decades of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth. Clinical psychology
has different intellectual ancestors. See generally EDWIN G. BORING, A HISTORY OF EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1929).
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ing one field of applied psychology after another—applications of
psychology to industry, education, medicine, psychotherapy, busi-
ness
—undertook the first exploration of legal issues through a psy-
chological lens. His 1908 book, On the Witness Stand, 29
 dealt with prob-
lems of the perception and memory of witnesses, crime detection,
confessions (especially false ones), influences on the examination of
witnesses, hypnotism and crime, and the prevention of crime. Some
of his points were sound, others flawed or quite speculative. 30
 Unfor-
tunately for the fledgling field, our evidence law forebear, John Henry
Wigmore, took a strong dislike to Miinsterberg's book, and published
a somewhat bizarre, but unmistakably scathing, critique of it. 31 Ap-
parently 1141insterberg never replied to Wigmore's attack, 32
 and we do
not know whether Wigmore's assault caused him to abandon his work
on law and psychology. Certainly it could have deterred others with an
interest in the intersections where the two fields might profitably have
met. One wonders what the body of psychology and evidence law
scholarship might have developed into, and how much sooner, if the
29
 HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).
Mansterberg's first two chapters, on memory, perception, and the fallibility of eye-
witnesses, foreshadowed much later work and basically were sound, though written in a
more casual fashion than contemporary reports of experimental work. For an assessment,
see Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., Hugo Miinsterberg, Portrait of an Applied Psychologist, in 4 Pon-
TRAITS OF PIONEERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 113, 113-30 (Gregory A. Kimble & Michael
Wertheimer eds., 2000). Mfinsterberg then argued, however, that psychologists could de-
tect lies about bad acts through a process of word association in which they present a sus-
pect with words that are neutral and words that are related to the crime and measure the
respective response times. MONSTERISERG, supra note 29, at 73-110. Wigmore effectively
demolished this assertion. See John H. Wigmore, Professor Miienstmbmg [sic] and the Psychol-
ogy of Testimony, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 427-31 (1909) (presenting a mock trial in which
members of the bar brought a claim of libel against Professor Mfinsterberg for overstating
the usefulness of psychologists as experts at trial). Other assertions by Mfinsterberg also
were highly speculative, including that post-hypnotic suggestion could cause someone to
bequeath all his money and then commit suicide, or that flashing lights increase sugges-
tiveness and could cause false confessions.
31 See generally Wigmore, supra lime 30.
32
 Part of the reason might be that Munsterberg was busy with other projects. The
same year that Wigmore's article appeared, Mfinsterberg published two more books, one
OD values and the other on the psychology of teaching. Hun° MUNSTERBERG, THE ETER-
NAL VALUES (1909); HUGO MONSTERBERG, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE TEACHER (1909). The
next year he was appointed an exchange professor from Harvard to the University of Ber
lin and sent on a quasi-diplomatic mission to establish an American Institute. BORING,
supra note 28, at 427-28. By then the stage was being set for the outbreak of the First
World War, and Mfinsterberg was trying vainly to reverse the momentum by promoting
cultural ties between his two homelands. Id.; MATTHEW HALE, JR., HUMAN SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL ORDER: HUGO MUNSTERBERG AND THE ORIGINS OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 103-05,
165-68 (1980); William Stern, Hugo Miinsterberg: In Memoriam, 1 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 186,
186 (1917).
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initial encounter had not been hobbled by the overreaching of its first
important contributor and the overreaction of its first important critic.
Wigmore also tried to derail the second major event in the his-
tory of evidence law and psychology. When a bright young Yale law
professor, Robert M. Hutchins, who in 1926 had just begun to teach
evidence, delivered a paper on psychology and the law of evidence,
Wigmore sent him a letter registering his disapproval and referring
Hutchins to Wigmore's earlier critique of Mfinsterberg." For good
measure, Wigmore also sent a complaint to the president of Yale Uni-
versity." Hutchins was not the least deterred. He took on psychologist
Donald Slesinger as a collaborator and together they wrote prolifically
on psychology and evidence law. 35 The articles drew from the extant
body of psychological research to scrutinize evidence doctrine, iden-
tify weaknesses, and suggest improvements. Professor Schlegel's ap-
praisal of them is that:
The articles were of a generally high quality, although their
effectiveness varied directly with respect to the quality and
relevance of the underlying psychological literature: where
good quantitative, behavioral studies were available, the arti-
cles were crisp and their criticisms effective; where an older,
introspective psychology or new freudian psychology pro-
vided the studies, the articles tended to be less well focused
and their criticisms weak. 56
Like other legal realist initiatives in law and social science, Hut-
chins and Slesinger's work just ran out of steam. The whole field of
law and any social science was somewhat dormant for a time, suffering
from lack of funding during the Great Depression and a redirection
33 See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 Runs. L. REV. 459, 480 n.101 (1979).
54 See id. at 474 n.83.
55 Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—
The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U. PA. L. REV.
725 (1929); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence—Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—Memory, 41 HARV. L REV. 860 (1928);
Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—Spontaneous
Exclamations, 28 CoLum. L. REV. 432 (1928); Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some
Observations on the Law of Evidence—State of Mind in Issue, 29 CoLum. L. REV. 147 (1929);
Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence—State of
Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE U. 283 (1929).
"Schlegel, supra note 33, at 482.
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of the energies of realist leaders during the Depression and the Sec-
ond World War. 37
 Hutchins left Yale in 1929 to become president of
the University of Chicago, and four years later, at the ripe age of
thirty-four, delivered an address in which he expressed doubts that the
psychology of the era could teach the law enough to answer the nec-
essary questions and resolve uncertainties about numerous evidence
rules and their applications. 38
B. Three Contemporary Stories of Success and Its Alternatives
1. Research Relevant to Eyewitness Identification
One of the first topics of major and continuing research has been
eyewitness identification accuracy—an initiative of psychologists, not
law professors. One of the early modern landmarks on this subject was
Elizabeth Loftus's book, Eyewitness Testimony, published by the Harvard
University Press. 38
 Today there are literally hundreds of studies on the
subject of eyewitness testimony; one bibliography of eyewitness re-
search lists 2000 entries, most of them scientific studies.° The body of
research, both field studies and laboratory studies, has been growing
at an increasing rate. 4' On many questions, the findings show a high
degree of convergence. Moreover, the research, unlike that of Man-
sterberg or that reviewed by Hutchins and Slesinger in their studies
on psychology and evidence, shows a high degree of sensitivity to the
legal context. The researchers do not stop at identifying factors, such
as weapon focus, that create poor witnessing conditions. They also
study witnessing within the legal system.
The weakness of eyewitness identification would not be such a
concern if jurors gave it proper weight. But are jurors sensitive to wit-
nessing conditions and problems? This topic has had the benefit of a
substantial amount of sophisticated research.° Do eyewitness experts
help jurors understand? That has also been the subject of controlled
experiments.° Do judges and lawyers understand problems with wit-
37 Id. at 585-86.
33
 Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 1 U. CIII. L. REV.
511,513 (1934).
33
 ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
° BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWIT-
NESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 68 (1995).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 173-80.
43 Id. at 213-24.
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nessing conditions? Can judicial instructions help? Is cross-examination
and adversarial testing sufficient to alert jurors to the dangers? All of
these context issues have been the subject of empirical research by
scholars in the field44—exactly what Wigmore and Hutchins were call-
ing for and bewailing the absence of.
The topic had become so popular that one of us, while an editor
Of the journal Law and Human Behavior, wrote an editorial urging psy-
cholegal scholars to tackle more than just eyewitness identification. 45
The dearth of scientific scholarship in the legal profession was noted
even in the pages of The New Yorker, where the author, Atul Gawande,
struck a tone similar to Miinsterberg's:
[T]he legal profession has conducted no further experi-
ments on the reliability of eyewitness evidence, or on much
else, for that matter. Science finds its way to the courthouse
in the form of "expert testimony"—forensic analysis, ballis-
tics, and so forth. But the law has balked at submitting its
methods to scientific inquiry. Meanwhile, researchers work-
ing outside the legal establishment have discovered that sur-
prisingly simple changes in legal procedures could substan-
tially reduce misidentification. They suggest how scientific
experimentation, which transformed medicine in the last
century, could transform the justice system in the next. 46
In contrast to a century.ago, today's research on eyewitness testimony
is far more complete, more carefully related to the legal context, and
more legally sophisticated. And this time around, the legal academy
has itself been much more receptive to and sophisticated about the
research. 47
44 Id. at 143-68, 255-64.
45 Michael J. Saks, The Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony Alone, 10 LAW Sc. HUM.
BEHAV. 279, 279 (1986). The author states:
I have received many papers devoted to the study of eyewitness phenomena;
more, in fact, than any other category. Yet the subject of eyewitnesses will oc-
cupy at the most only a few hours of a law student's academic life; only a frac-
tion of the thousands of annual pages in law reviews; can be only one of a
large number of issues a judiciary committee will address itself to in a year's
policy making.
Id.
46 Atul Gawande, Under Suspicion, New YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 50, 50.
47
 Thus, Gawande's criticism is unfair, at least as it pertains to eyewitness identification
research.
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Psychologists have studied the effect of eyewitness age, eyewitness
sex, sex of the target person, training of eyewitnesses (such as bank
tellers) in how to identify, the dubious value of consistency of descrip-
tion and eyewitness confidence, the effects of disguise and weapon
focus, the rate of decay of memory, the effects of post-event informa-
tion (such as seeing mugshots before making a lineup identification),
exposure time, distinctiveness of the target, length of retention inter-
val, encoding instructions, biases in lineup structure and composition,
the effect of context reinstatement (having the eyewitness do the
identification in the same surroundings as the crime), live v. video v.
still pictures at exposure and at identification, and the difficulties of
cross-racial identification and whether people with friends of another
race are better identifiers than others.° Psychologists also have done
studies of jurors, finding that juror subjects often overemphasize fac-
tors that have only a weak relationship to accuracy, such as witness
confidence, and underestimate other factors, such as the witness's
age, the effect of disguise, or the distinctiveness of the target person. 49
What have been the legal consequences of this research? One
important question that evidence casebooks address is whether expert
testimony is admissible to alert jurors to the dangers of eyewitness
identifications by pointing out the factors that increase or decrease
eyewitness accuracy. 5° Most courts continue to hold that it is within
the discretion of trial judges to exclude this evidence, but there are
exceptions. 51
 Some trial judges, of course, exercise their discretion in
favor of admitting it, especially when the eyewitness identification is
crucial and when it fits the facts of the case. 52
More recently, eyewitness identification research has had an even
more important effect on the administration of justice. It has sug-
gested policy for the conduct of eyewitness identification procedures
to minimize the risk of erroneous convictions without increasing the
risk of erroneous failures to identify. In 1998, the American Psychol-
ogy-Law Society produced a white paper on eyewitness identification
48
 For examples of these studies, see those cited in Peter Shapiro & Steven Penrod, A
Meta-Analysis of the Facial Identification Literature, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139,154-56 (1986).
See id. at 171-209.
50 See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 599-600 (4th ed. 2000); joN R. WALTZ & ROGER C.
PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 935-45 (10th ed. 2004).
51
 For leading cases holding exclusion of expert testimony about eyewitness identifica-
tion to be an abuse of discretion under the circumstances, see State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d
1208,1223-24 (Ariz. 1983) and People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709,726-27 (Cal. 1984).
52 See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62,72-73 (D. Mass. 1999).
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written by a number of leading eyewitness researchers. 53 Their rec-
ommendations included:
• selecting lineup foils (or fillers) to resemble the witness's descrip-
tion (rather than the suspect's);
• blind administration of lineups (because police officers who in-
teract with the witness should not know who the suspect is);
• instructing the witness that the culprit might or might not be in
the lineup (in order to reduce relative judgment); 54
• sequential lineups or photospreads (whereby witnesses see one
lineup member at a time and must declare whether that person is
or is not the perpetrator, which is also designed to reduce relative
judgment); and
• recording the confidence of the witness immediately following
any identification (in view of the high persuasiveness of this rela-
tively unimportant element, and the malleability of confidence
after the witness receives confirming or disconfirming post-
identification information) . 55
The U.S. Department of Justice has adopted most of these recom-
mendations (with the notable exception of blind testing) 56 and has
advised all police agencies throughout the United States to follow
them. 57 Other jurisdictions have gone further. The Illinois Governor's
Commission on Capital Punishment recommended double-blind
lineups and the state's General Assembly funded a limited program of
53 Gary L. Wells, Mark Small, Steven Penrod, Roy S. Malpass, Solomon M. Fulero
Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Pho-
tospreads, 22 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 603 (1998).
54 "Relative judgment" is the phenomenon whereby eyewitnesses tend to select the
person in the lineup who comes closest to looking like the perpetrator rather than the
person they believe is the perpetrator.
55 Wells et al., supra note 53, at 627-29, 632, 635, 639.
56 Police representatives on the Department of Justice task force felt that a require-
ment of blind administration reflected a lack of trust in officers conducting lineups. They
agreed that officers should not give cues to witnesses as to who the officer knew the suspect
to be, but argued that they could accomplish this by willing themselves to behave properly.
Interestingly, blind protocols are common in scientific research, where those scientists do
not feel at all demeaned to impose blind testing regimes on themselves and see good
methodology as the surest path to accurate results. Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the
Police Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 594
(2000).
57 U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, at
iii—iv, 9 (1999).
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implementation and study of the procedure. 58
 New Jersey has
adopted double-blind lineups on a statewide basis. 59
2. Research Relevant to Character Evidence
The legal literature on character evidence has varied in its use of
insights from academic literature on psychology. 6° Professor Uviller
produced an influential article on character evidence without ex-
pressly relying upon insights from the psychology literature. 81 Other
articles do cite and discuss the literature on psychology, but are rela-
tively cautious in their use of it.° Still others have been more daring,
using personality theory to argue that character evidence is worthless
or virtually worthless.°
The theory that character evidence lacks probative value finds
support in a view of personality that sees situational pressures as being
more important as a cause of human behavior than are general traits of
character. Thus, whether a person is in a hurry to keep an important
appointment is likely to be a more powerful determinant of whether he
will stop to help someone in distress than what we can find out about
that person's general disposition toward self-sacrifice." Some legal
614
 Thomas P. Sullivan, Preventing Wrongful Convictions—A Current Report from Illinois, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 605, 608-09 (2004).
59 Gary L. Wells, Police Lineups: Data, Theory, and Policy, 7 Psvcnot. PUB. POL'Y & L.
79L 791 (2001).
6°
 For an extensive examination of the complexities of the character evidence doc-
trine, see generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1999).
61
 Uviller, supra note 23.
62 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 23, at 646-54; Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New
Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Stud-
ies, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 1003, 1041-60 (1984); Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the
Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 226-36 (1996); Roger C. Park, Character at
the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717 passim (1998).
69
 For legal scholars who have used the psychology literature to support an especially
strong view of the uselessness of character evidence, see Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the
Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 5, 32 (1988); David P.
Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence,
58 U. Cow. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (1986-87); Robert G. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its
Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 351 (1979). But see Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of
Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 533-36 (1991)
(using personality theory to argue that opinion and specific-acts evidence on character
should be admissible during the prosecution's case in chief).
09 See John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho": A Study of Situ-
ational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
100, 107-08 (1973) (study of effect of being in a hurry on seminarians' behavior in help-
ing strangers).
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scholars have used "situationist" personality theory to argue that char-
acter evidence ought to be broadly excluded.° They have found fur-
ther support in studies of "fundamental attribution error," studies
showing that people tend to attribute too much power to dispositions
and too little to situations.° For example, when experimental subjects
are asked to predict how people will react in certain situations where
behavior has been tested in prior experiments, they tend to err on the
side of underestimating the power of situations.°
Along with the benefits of informing legal thought with interdis-
ciplinary materials such as those discussed above come certain risks.
One is the risk of applying literature that is too scant, too selective,
and too old.° Another is the danger of using research that does not
generalize to the legal situation. The first risk is somewhat hard to
avoid. We can't expect law professors to be on the cutting edge of re-
search in another field. Still, one can take precautions, such as avoid-
ing the temptation to take one's psychology from law review articles
and the empirical studies cited in them, and checking one's conclu-
sions against recent editions of standard college texts on the subject.°
65 See Foster, supra note 63, at 32 ("Social psychology data reflect the conclusion that
prior convictions have virtually no probative value as a predictor for determining a witness'
in-court veracity."); Leonard, supra note 63, at 26 ("[Als currently conceptualized by the
law, character evidence often fails the test of logical relevance."); Spector, supra note 63, at
351 ("Character evidence used as a basis for predicting human behavior is useless the
legal conclusion therefore ought to be that evidence of character has no probative
value."); cf. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable
Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758, 783 (1974-75) (describing a less radical theory that
considers both a person's trait and the situation).
66 For a description of these experiments, see LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE
PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119-44 (1991). Here,
incidentally, guided by the work of Ross & Nisbett, is where the debate about psychology
and the character rule might have been directed most usefully: not the question of whether
stable traits exist but whether factfinders over-attribute behavior to traits (and under-
attribute the influence of situations) or too easily infer a trait from learning about a small
sample of conduct.
67 Id.
68 Sometimes old research is every bit as good as, or better than, the most recent stud-
ies. Here, we use the elderliness of research as a shorthand for research which has been
supplanted by better and more complete research, leading to different overall conclusions.
68 For an example, see David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered to
Prove Conduct?, 58 U. Coup. L. Rzv. 279, 283 n.10 (1987). Professor Crump reviewed two
college textbooks to check the current status of trait theory, noting that "[b]oth of these
books were used as texts in courses offered at the University of California (Davis) in 1987
and were purchased at the campus bookstore by the author of this Essay." Id. Admittedly,
following Professor Crump's example would put legal scholars in the unwonted role of
paying money for books, but perhaps interlibrary loans or faculty expense accounts could
soften the blow.
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Another possibility is to follow Hutchins's example and seek a psy-
chologist as a co-author.
The second challenge is to make sure that the interdisciplinary
literature "fits"—that is, that it generalizes to the relevant legal con-
text. This requires examination of the underlying literature and use
of the basic skill exercised by doctrinal scholars, that of drawing dis-
tinctions. Sensing the lack of generalizability does not require going
to somebody else's library and digging through poorly indexed psy-
chology journals. One only needs to look at whatever psychology re-
search was cited and think about its applicability to the trial context.
For example, the two works most heavily relied upon in law review
articles" were Hartshorne and May's massive 1928 workn and Walter
Mischel's 1968 book, Personality and Assessment?? These were seminal
works, deservedly influential in psychology. In assessing their applica-
bility to issues of evidence law, however, legal scholars need to con-
sider the behavior examined in those works and think about its gen-
eralizability to the behavior at issue in those situations where the law
admits or excludes evidence of character.
Hartshorne and May studied deceptive behavior in thousands of
schoolchildren. Under observation, children were given the opportu-
nity to steal coins, to lie, or to cheat on a test." The authors com-
pared children's propensity to engage in different kinds of dishonest
or deceptive behavior—for example, cheating on self-graded class-
room tests compared to stealing coins or cheating on tests of athletic
ability. They found that correlations between different kinds of dis-
honest or deceptive behaviors were very modest. 74
Mischel evaluated the accuracy and utility of psychological as-
sessments of character traits and of psychodynamic states (ego
strength, defenses, repression, dependency, etc.). Much of his ground-
breaking book focuses on the reliability and validity of personality tests
and clinical assessments. Clinical assessments did not stand up well ei-
ther in terms of interrater reliability or in terms of external measures,
1° See articles cited supra notes 62, 63, 65.
71
 HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928).
72
 WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968).
73
 See HARTSHORNE & MAY, DOW note 71, at 90-103.
14 See id. at 382-84. The authors stated that "as we progressively change the situation
we progressively lower the correlations between the tests.... [W]e interpret these facts to
mean that the consistency of the individual is a function of the situation." Id. at 384.
Hartshorne and May concluded that "[t]he results of these studies show that neither de-
ceit nor its opposite, 'honesty,' are unified character traits, but rather specific functions of
life situations." Id. at 411.
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such as progress of the patient." Pencil-and-paper personality tests
and tests such as the Rorschach test, sentence completion tests, and
the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) did not correlate very highly
with each other or with measures of behavior." His views about the
lack of utility of trait-state theories are tied to his preference for "social
behavior" therapy—for instance, counter-conditioning and extinction
of phobias by small steps during which the patient becomes desensi-
tized to the object of fear—as opposed to psychodynamic analysis
based upon the belief that a person's basic personality can be inferred
from cues such as performance on projective tests, Freudian slips, or
interpretation of dreams." He found that hypotheses about general-
ized traits often did not stand up. For example, he noted that some
psychodynamic theorists believe that reactions toward authority stem-
ming from attitudes towards parental figures would generalize to atti-
tudes towards superiors in the workplace." However, experimental
testing indicates that there was no substantial correlation between atti-
tudes toward fathers and attitudes toward bosses.'" He obtained similar
results in examining attitudes towards peers and comparing them to
attitudes toward siblings." Thus, Mischel concluded that "there was
little evidence for generality of attitudes either toward authority or to-
ward peers."81
Mischel also expressed doubt about the generality of the psycho-
logical construct of an "authoritarian personality." 82 Psychologists had
hypothesized that persons with authoritarian personalities had little
tolerance for ambiguity. But tests that measure different types of in-
tolerance of ambiguity had little correlation with each other." He
noted similar results with the posited personality trait of "rigidity."84
Similarly, pencil-and-paper anxiety scales correlated substantially with
each other, but not with psychological measures of anxiety. 85 He
noted generally that when behaviors are measured by tests with simi-
lar formats and content there are substantial correlations but the cor-
MISCHEL, supra note 72, at 106-48.
7€ Id. at 118-23.
77 Id. at 149-50.
78 /d. at 21.
79 Id. at 22.
€0 MISCHEL, supra note 72, at 22.
si Id.
82 ht. at 28.
€5 Id.
" Id. at 29.
88 M1SCHEL, supra note 72, at 81.
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relation often does not hold when the same behaviors are measured
by different means. 8° Though much of his book deals with correla-
tions between psychological tests or between tests and personality rat-
ings by subjects or their acquaintances, sometimes he also considered
studies that involved observed behavior. For example, he referred to
the Hartshorne and May study as one in which cheating on one test
did not have a high correlation with cheating on a different type of
test, and lying in classroom situations showed almost no correlation
with deception in out-of-classroom situations. 87 He noted that ex-
periments in which children's propensity to delay gratification was
observed indicated that this behavior was also malleable, and could be
influenced by such situational factors as observation by the children
of the behavior of adult confederates who modeled patience.°
The question for the law of evidence is whether the findings of
the studies reviewed and reported by Hartshorne and May and
Mischel—and cited by proponents as the basis for a strict ban on
character evidence—generalize to the situation of greatest interest to
the law of evidence. One can question the relevance of the studies
involving children. To what extent is the moral behavior of children
stable enough to make one think that what is learned from those stud-
ies tells us about the behavior of adults? 89 Similarly, valid research
about the predictive value of ordinary behavior does not necessarily
generalize to the prediction of extreme behavior. 90
When the legal issue is whether evidence showing propensity for
criminal violence should be admitted, there is an additional problem
of "fit": none of the underlying research in the studies referred to
dealt with criminal or violent behavior. Although decades of research
have carried the Hartshorne and May findings beyond the lying,
cheating, and stealing of schoolchildren to a far wider array of behav-
ior and situations, and though the studies reviewed by Mischel and
their progeny similarly examined a wide array of behavior, it is not
clear that they generalize to violent behavior. Conclusions about the
" Id. at 101.
87 Id. at 23-25.
88 Id. at 151-52.
89 This has been itself a research problem in psychology: what factors enable the pre-
diction of a person's adult behavior from his or her behavior as a child? One of the best
answers has been temperament (activity level, emotionality, sociability, impulsivity). See
ARNOLD H. Buss & ROBERT PLOMIN, A TEMPERAMENT THEORY OF PERSONALITY DEVELOP-
MENT 7-8 (1975); Jerome Kagan, Temperamental Contributions to Social Behavior, 44 Am. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 668,668 (1989).
9° See Ross & Nisart-r, supra note 66, at 116-17; Park, supra note 62, at 737 & n.67.
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lack of cross-situational consistency of behavior have been based on
studies that generally examine nonviolent, noncriminal behavior of
normal research participants. 91 This is not a criticism of that body of
research, but simply an observation that they do not include the be-
havior of greatest relevance to the law, and a caution about generaliz-
ing from those findings to the legal question of the predictive power
of character and other-crimes evidence. Some of the studies do deal
with aggression, a trait construct that seems somewhat analogous to
violent criminal conduct, but the reported research on that trait gives
little comfort to those who believe that behavior is highly unstable
and situation-dependent. 92 At the end of the day, external validity
(generalizability) can only be determined empirically, not logically.
Even for the behavior studied, Mischel did not offer extreme
claims about the absence of individual differences or the irrelevance
of prior behavior. He even looked favorably upon the use of other-act
evidence for prediction of behavior in certain situations, considering
it superior to clinical psychodynamic assessments based on constructs
such as "infantile dependency needs" or "passive-aggressive character
make-up."93 Indeed, one of the important implications that psycholo-
gists took from Mischel's findings was that personality measures are
weaker predictors than past behavior is, leading to the aphorism that
"the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior." 94 By focusing
on the behavior, as a matter of sheer prediction, it does not matter
01 For a useful review of these studies, see generally Ross &	 supra note 66.
92 See WALTER MISCI-IEL, INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY 480-81 (5th ed. 1993) ("Ag-
gression is a dimension of behavior on which stable individual differences have been iden-
tified beginning in grade school. These differences remain stable even over long periods
of time."); see also LEONARD BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
CONTROL 131 (1993); Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, A Control Theory Interpreta-
tion of Psychological Research on Aggression, in AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INTERAC-
TIONIST PERSPECTIVES 47,50 (Richard B. Felson & James T Tedeschi eds., 1993) ("[W]hat
is not arguable is that aggressive behavior, however engendered, once established, remains
remarkably stable across time, situation, and even generations within a family" (quoting L.
Rowell Huesmann et al., Stability of Aggression over Time, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL Psvcutot.
1120,1133 (1984))); Dan Olweus, Stability of Aggressive Reaction Patterns in Males: A Review,
86 PSYCIIOL. BULL. 852,872-73 (1979). The famous Milgram experiments, in which sub-
jects were induced to give seemingly dangerous (but fake) electric shocks to confederates
when told to do so by an authority figure, could be adduced as evidence that criminal ag-
gression is highly situational, but these experiments are better regarded as testing obedi-
ence to authority than as a test of antisocial aggressiveness. See Ross & NISRETT, supra note
66, at 52-58; Gottfredson & Hirschi, supra,.at 53 (Miigram's studies "measure compliance,
obedience, or ... acquiescence," rather than aggression).
MISCUEL, supra note 72, at 135-48.
94 Id.
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whether the causes are internal biological or personality factors that
we have not yet discovered and measured or whether the causes are
external situational ones (and the behavior recurs because similar
situations are repeatedly encountered). In this respect, one might
find in Mischel a trace of support for admission of bad-act evidence
that evidence judges would see as character evidence, and for exclu-
sion of expert clinical assessments that judges might see as falling out-
side the character ban."
What about the findings of research that has focused on individ-
ual differences in and predictors of violence and aggression? Some of
that research suggests more useful explanatory and predictive factors.
For example, the effects of age and gender are well recognized, with a
greatly disproportionate amount of violent crime committed by males
between eighteen and twenty-one years of age. 96
 Among prisoners
who had been convicted of unprovoked violent acts (as compared to
prisoners convicted of nonviolent crimes) the former had higher lev-
els of testosterone, 97
 and among non-prison populations, boys and
men with higher testosterone levels were more likely to respond ag-
gressively to provocation." When aggression has been rewarded, es-
pecially intermittently, it tends to persist. 99 Some men have long re-
cords of criminal violence, which has been found to serve one of two
major purposes: to command respect among associates and for more
instrumental purposes.'" A review of a large body of research on
people who participate in violent and other criminal activity found
" Evidence judges are sometimes more willing to let in bad-act evidence to impeach a
witness when it supports an expert psychiatric assessment by a clinician than when it is
offered for the naked inference that because the subject previously engaged in bad-act
behavior, he is likely to do so again. The expert testimony can be viewed as being about an
illness or medical condition, whereas naked bad-act evidence is likely to be viewed as for-
bidden evidence of character. See United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1162 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1983).
" See generallyjAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE
(1985).
97
 James M. Dabbs Jr., Timothy S. Carr, Robert L. Frady & Jasmin K. Riad, Testosterone,
Grime, and Misbehavior Among 692 Male Prison Inmates, 18 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIF-
FERENCES 627, 631 (1995); James M. Dabbs Jr., Testosterone Measurements in Social and Clini-
cal Psychology, 111 Soc. & CLINICAL Psyclim.. 302, 309 (1992).
Be John Archer, The Influence of Testosterone on Human Aggression, 82 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 1,
13-14 (1991); James M. Dabbs, Jr. & Robin Morris, Testosterone, Social Class, and Antisocial
Behavior in a Sample of 4,462 Men, 1 PSYCHOL. Sc'. 209, 209 (1990).
" See generally Gerald R. Patterson, Richard A. Littman & William Bricker, Assertive Be-
havior in Children: A Step Toward a Theory of Aggression, 32 MONOGRAPHS SOC'Y FOR RES.
CHILD DEV. 39 (1967).
100 HANS TOCH, VIOLENT MEN 133-34 (1992).
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that such conduct clusters among genetically closely-related individu-
als. 101
The most voluminous work, which has focused squarely on the
question of the predictability of violence, has been in the area of
mental illness and violence. Consistent with the findings of Mischel
and others, clinicians using psychiatric theories and diagnoses long
have had difficulty predicting .who among the mentally ill will commit
acts of violence and who will not." That persistent finding has been
helpful in leading researchers away from reliance on clinical assess-
ment to study specific risk factorsm and to apply those risk factors
actuarially. This has increased the power of violence prediction. Men-
tal disorder itself is "a risk factor of modest magnitude for the occur-
rence of violence." 104 The factors most useful for predicting the vio-
lence proneness of the mentally disordered are the same as those
useful for predicting in the general offender population—namely,
criminal history, antisocial personality, substance abuse, and family
dysfunction. 1 °5 Prediction tools using the risk factor approach have
greatly improved predictive power, though it remains less than a pre-
101 WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 96, at 90-100. For researchers, the debate over
these findings focuses on whether they reflect biological differences (inherited or other-
wise) or whether they are differences in how these closely related individuals were raised in
their families of origin. Leon Kamin, Is Crime in the Genes? The Answer May Depend on Who
Chooses What Evidence, Sci. AM., Feb. 1986, at 22, 22 (criticizing Wilson and Herrnstein's
lack of empirical basis for their arguments and their failure to distinguish between causa-
tion and correlation); Heathcote W. Wales, Tilting at Crime: The Perils of Eclecticism, '74 GEO.
L.J. 481, 489-91 (1985). The day may be drawing near when extensions of the human ge-
nome project will allow far more precise predictions of at least some kinds and causes of
violent behavior. See 60 Minutes: Murder Gene (CBS television broadcast Feb. 10, 1999) (pro-
filing Jeff Landrigan, an Arizona death row prisoner with an extensive criminal record
matching that of his biological father, Darrel Hill, who is also on death row in Arkansas,
even though the son was adopted out of his biological family in infancy). In the meantime,
the U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide whether Jeff Landrigan made a colorable claim that
he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to submit
during sentencing evidence of his (partly genetic) predisposition to violence. See generally
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3162
(U.S. Sept. 26, 2006) (No. 05-1575). For the issue of the admissibility of past acts, the cause of
the behavior matters little; the persistence of the behavior is the relevant finding.
102 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
§§ 12:1, 12:20 (David L Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks & Joseph Sanders eds.,
2005) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] ("[T] he sober conclusion that clini-
cians are 'modestly better than chance' at predicting violence appears to be becoming the
consensus view.").
105 See generally JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MAC.AR-
THUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001).
104 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102, § 12:12.
105 Id. § 12:19.
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cise art or science. 06
 The occurrence of past violent acts is predictive;
the more of the acts and the more serious they are, the higher the
predictive accuracy. 107
Ultimately, what the law needs to know is whether reform will in-
crease the accuracy of factfinder conclusions. The possible reforms
run from exclusionary proposals (barring character and other-acts
evidence) to the more inclusive proposals (making character evidence
in some form, as well as other-acts evidence, more available). To reach
such conclusions, the law must learn more about the actual utility of
"character" and prior acts in predicting behavior (or else it must
guess), as well as about how factfinders will process those kinds of in-
formation. The research referred to is clearly relevant to those tasks,
but also is insufficient.
What we have seen so far is that clinical opinions about personal-
ity traits may be less useful than practitioners believe as a predictor of
future behavior, but that past behavior might be more useful, espe-
cially if the violent behavior has been recurrent, if the situation set-
tings for the behavior at issue were similar, and if factfinders can be
given realistic, informative, data-based cautions about the predictive
power of the evidence. 108
 It is by no means out of the question that a
high comparative propensity to engage in violent behavior could have
great value, when used in conjunction with incident-specific evidence,
in post-dieting whether a person committed a single act of that type of
behavior on a particular occasion.
The larger point we have tried to make is not about whether the
body of psychological research points toward an expansion or a con-
traction of the prohibition on character evidence. The larger point is
about generalizing and distinguishing studies, about making fair and
informed use of studies, and about trying to reach a correct answer to
evidence policy questions. In using social science literature, legal schol-
ars should not lose the standards that they would apply in creating first-
rate doctrinal scholarship. First-rate doctrinal scholarship is not advo-
cacy scholarship; the authors do not snatch quotations from cases on
their side and ignore cases on the other side. They are expected to
squarely confront authority on the other side and to argue why it is in-
apposite or wrongly decided, if they conclude that it is. Secondly, doc-
trinal scholars are expected to read the authorities that they rely upon
106 id. § 12:13.
107 See MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 44-47.
105
 Though we say this with some trepidation, a Bayesian format for presenting the in-
formation might be most appropriate. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
2006]	 Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered 	 973
with care and determine whether they are applicable or distinguish-
able. They should do no less when using psychology authority.
3. Research Relevant to the Hearsay Rule
The first empirical study of the juror use of hearsay was published
in 1991. 109
 Since then there have been at least twenty-six other stud-
ies, most of them original empirical work as opposed to reviews or
commentary on empirical work by others."° Unlike the eyewitness
studies, the hearsay studies often involve collaboration between law
professors and psychologists. Fourteen of theses studies were co-
authored by law professors, one by a lawyer, and two by William C.
Thompson, a psychology professor who has a law degree and who
probably spends more time in court than most law professors who
teach evidence.i"r These close collaborations are entirely understand-
able. For hearsay research, lawyers and psychologists need each other.
The legal setting of eyewitness identification problems is easy for
someone with no formal law training to understand. But the legal
context in which hearsay issues arise, the rationales of the hearsay
rule, and the situations in which out-of-court statements would be
admissible in a real trial are things that can be understood only by
someone who has carefully studied the concepts.
to essence, these studies present some mock jurors with the
"live" testimony of a witness with personal knowledge and other
mock jurors with the same information from a hearsay witness. The
research question asked by most of these studies is whether the ju-
rors discount the evidence they acquired through hearsay, reflecting
their recognition of its weaknesses compared with the firsthand wit-
ness. A few studies have been clever enough to ask whether the ju-
rors are able to make proper use of the hearsay evidence in order to
move closer to an accurate conclusion about the underlying
events. 112 For example, if the out-of-court declarant's statements
109 Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical En-
quiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 65 (1991).
110 For a bibliography, see Roger C. Park, Visions of Applying the Scientific Method to the
Hearsay Rule, 2003 Wm. ST. L. REV. 1149,1171-74.
ni Id. In addition to arguing appellate cases involving high-tech forensic science,
Thompson was co-counsel for O.J. Simpson in People u Simpson.
I " Maithilec K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury: Effects of
Suggestion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL PUB. POLY & L. 372,
381-86 (1999).
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were made under the influence of suggestive questioning, does that
troublesome fact come through to the jurors as well by way of a
hearsay witness as it does by examination of the firsthand witness? 115
Some studies created mock cases, the "truth" of which is not only
not known but does not exist; 114
 others created a set of true underly-
ing facts, and the jurors' conclusions about the event could be com-
pared to its reality. 115
 Some of the studies presented the "case" by
way of brief written transcripts or even briefer summaries," 5
 others
by audio or videotaped presentations of mock trials." 7 In some stud-
113 rd.
114 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding, Rebecca Polley Sanchez & Sandra A. Sego, The Be-
lievability of Hearsay Testimony in a Child Sexual Assault Thal 21 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 299, 304
(1997); Landsman & Rakos, supra note 109, at 73.
"6
 Peter Miene, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the Evalua-
tion of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 688-89 (1992). This reveals a major advan-
tage to simulation studies in this context. In actual trials, rarely can one know what the
true underlying facts were. Some of the studies were ingenious enough to begin by having
the "hearsay witnesses" observe a videotaped event (the underlying reality that would be at
issue) and then be videotaped being interviewed about what they had seen. Those inter-
views became the "in court" hearsay testimony heard by the mock jurors. See Margaret Bull
Kovera, Roger C. Park & Steven D. Penrod, jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evi-
dence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1992). The results of such studies can provide insights
into the ability of mock jurors to reach accurate conclusions about the underlying events
that are otherwise completely unavailable.
116 See, e.g., Golding et al., supra note 114, at 304; Landsman & Rakos, .supra note 109,
at 73; Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Find-
ings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REV. 655, 659 (1992).
117 See, e.g., Miene et al., supra note 115, at 689; Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, ./u-
rare Use of Hearsay Evidence: The Effects of 7}pe and Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & Hum.
BEHAV. 501, 506 (1998). Professor Michael Seigel argues that all hearsay experiments in
which the trial stimuli were videotaped fail to test any difference between hearsay and non-
hearsay conditions. Professor Seigel writes:
[A]lthough each of the studies purports to examine the ability of human sub-
jects to differentiate and discount hearsay in comparison with witness testi-
mony, they actually measure individuals' abilities to differentiate among dif-
ferent types of hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Remarkably, the articles
are silent on this critical issue concerning their internal design.
Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 995,
1042-43 (1994). As applied to videotaped simulations, this criticism is conceptually barren.
The hearsay rule is actually two rules: the important and consequential rule that a witness
cannot report another person's statement if it is used for its truth, and the relatively trivial
rule that witnesses testifying to firsthand observations cannot testify by videotape. Because
these two rules both share the label "hearsay" instead of being called the "secondhand
information rule" and the "videotape rule," Professor Seigel believes that a trial presented
by videotape cannot tell us anything about the processing of secondhand information. He
gives no reason for this other than the labels. To be sure, videotaped trials are not real
trials, but this challenge to validity is no more serious in the hearsay context than in any
other context using videotaped stimuli, such as studies of the effects of jury instructions.
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ies the hearsay witness was a layperson,lls in others an expert wit-
ness. 119 In some the firsthand witness was cross-examinedi" and in
others not. 121 And so on.
Put succinctly, some of these studies appear to offer greater veri-
similitude than others. 122 And, perhaps more important, the studies
asked different research questions, thereby having more (or less)
relevance to the legal policy questions about hearsay that need to be
asked and answered. The results, however, cannot be put succinctly.
The circumstances of some studies revealed jurors to be quite capable
of heavily discounting hearsay testimony as compared to firsthand
witness testimony. 123 In other studies, the jurors credited the hearsay
as much as they did the firsthand testimony. 124 It is not always clear
what the right or ideal response should be to the hearsay testimony, in
contrast to the testimony of the firsthand witness.
Whatever their methods and findings, these studies are an impor-
tant start, but certainly no more than a start, in a complex area of evi-
dence law and policy. Reflecting on how they relate to evidence policy,
and especially on where they cast light or fall short of casting light,
should guide more and better studies in the future. Our reflections be-
low are organized in terms of three important issues of hearsay policy.
a. Whether Hearsay Should Be Received when There Is a Choice Between
Hearsay and Live Testimony
This first issue of hearsay policy arises when a live firsthand wit-
ness is available, but a party would like to offer a hearsay witness in-
us See Golding et al, supra note 114, at 304.
119 Regina A. Schuller & Angela Paglia, An Empirical Study: Juror Sensitivity to Variations
in Hearsay Conveyed via Expert Evidence, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV 131,137-38 (1999) (find-
ing no differences in verdicts as a function of the amount of hearsay underlying an expert
opinion, though other measures suggested that the participants were able to distinguish
between hearsay that was supported by other evidence presented at trial and hearsay that
was not supported in that fashion).
1" See Rakos & Landsman, .supra note 116, at 658-60.
121 See Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 707-10.
122 It is far from clear whether realistic simulations are necessary to get correct answers
that are generalizable to actual trial settings. A comparison of simulations with more and
with less verisimilitude found that the results did not differ. Brian H. Bornstein, The Eco-
logical Validity °Bury Simulations: Is the fury Still Out?, 23 LAW & Hum. BEI-IAV. 75,88 (1999).
But it almost certainly is the case that lawyers and judges are more persuaded by studies
that share many superficial similarities with trial procedures.
125 See Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 719; Miene et al., supra note 115, at 691.
124 See Golding et al., supra note 114, at 318; Jonathan M. Golding, Mary C. Alexander
& Terri L. Stewart, The Effect of Hearsay Witness Age in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 420,433 (1999).
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stead. The policymaker must ask whether harm is done by allowing
adversaries to substitute hearsay for available live testimony. Most ju-
rists would agree that the principal harm would be the loss of cross-
examination. 125 It is risky to allow adversaries to substitute hearsay
evidence for cross-examined evidence. They will substitute hearsay for
live testimony when the substitution helps their case. An advocate
would choose to forgo the benefits of a vivid live presentation when
the advocate does not want to have her witness questioned by the op-
ponent, which is exactly the situation in which cross-examination
might turn up information helpful in finding the truth.
The existing empirical studies of hearsay simply do not address
this issue. They do not try to study whether adversaries would choose
to present inferior evidence in the absence of a hearsay rule, and they
do not attempt to examine the value of cross-examination in uncover-
ing new evidence. The experiments focus on the modality of presen-
tation of the evidence, not on whether the trial procedure of cross-
examination uncovers useful new information. What the studies test is
the impact of the medium, just as in an experiment comparing the
effects of live testimony with the effects of closed-circuit television tes-
timony. There is no attempt to determine whether cross-examination
might bring out new facts or reveal collateral facts bearing on the
credibility of the witness.
That is not so much a flaw in the studies as it is a limitation on
the inferences that can be drawn from them. The hearsay studies that
seek to say something about the accuracy of hearsay, as opposed to its
impact, do not seek to simulate any kind of cross-examination, much
less typical cross-examination. 126 Thus it is obvious that they are of
limited usefulness in assessing the value of hearsay testimony as a sub-
stitute for cross-examined testimony.
b. Whether Hearsay Should Be Received when There Is No Choice
A different issue of hearsay policy is presented when the decla-
rant is unavailable, so that hearsay testimony is the only way of learn-
ing her account of the facts. Here, there is a strong common-sense
argument that hearsay is better than nothing at all, that one need not
146
	 substitution has other consequences, such as precluding physical confronta-
tion between the witness and the accused in criminal cases and allowing evidence to be
received from out-of-court declarants who were not under oath or subject to observation
for demeanor cues.
128 See Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 707-10; Pathak & Thompson, supra note 112, at
375-77,379-80.
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go in the dark because the light is not perfect. But the hearsay rule
sometimes bars such testimony. 127 The empirical question is whether
hearsay evidence is so misleading that it ought to be excluded even
when live testimony is not an alternative. Here, empirical studies can
be helpful even if they do not simulate adversarial incentives to substi-
tute hearsay for live testimony. Nonetheless, it is difficult to use the
existing experiments to reach conclusions about this issue.
The legal policy issue is whether hearsay would be helpful to the
jury in reaching the ground truth. In most of the experiments, the
ground truth was not known to the experimenter, as we noted above. 128
In two of the experiments, however, the investigators did have accurate
knowledge of the ground truth. 129 They controlled and recorded the
events witnessed by the hearsay declarant and by the person reporting
the content of the hearsay statements, and examined the question
whether the juror subjects were able to use the secondhand informa-
tion to reconstruct accurately what actually happened.
Neither of those experiments simulated cross-examination.'"
Here it is necessary to distinguish between cross-examination of the
declarant and cross-examination of the in-court hearsay witness. If the
declarant is not available for cross-examination, the legal policy issue
does not turn on whether it would be better to hear from a cross-
examined declarant or from a hearsay witness, because cross-
examining the declarant is not an option. But an experiment would
cast clearer light on the legal situation if it involved cross-examination
of the hearsay witness. The cross-examiner could ask questions that
might undermine the believability of the hearsay witness. At a mini-
mum, these questions make it more apparent to the jurors that the
hearsay witness did not see the event, does not know from firsthand
127 See United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 881-83 (D.C. Cir. 1978); ROGER C. PARK,
TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 4:6 (2d ed. 2001). The increasing popularity of the con-
cept that a defendant forfeits his hearsay/confrontation objection by silencing the victim
could, however, someday lead to free admission of victim statements, at !east in cases in
which there is enough evidence of homicide to allow the trial judge to find that the prose-
cution has laid the foundation for forfeiture by showing that the defendant killed the vic-
tim. See People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 850 (Ct. App.), petition for review granted, 102
P.3d 930 (2004); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004) (holding that defendant
forfeited the right to confrontation by murdering victim (citing Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 IsR. L REv. 506 (1997))).
1211 See WPM note 114 and accompanying text.
129 Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 707-09; Pathak & Thompson, supra note 112, at
375-81.
199 Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 707-09; Pathak & Thompson, supra note 112, at
375-81.
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knowledge what happened, is relying solely on the declarant, and
does not know the witnessing conditions of the declarant (such as
whether something was in the way or whether the declarant was pay-
ing attention).
c. Whether Erroneous Admission of Hearsay Should Be Deemed Prejudicial Error
Appellate courts often confront the question whether erroneous
admission or exclusion of hearsay is prejudicial error. When an evi-
dence error is harmless in the sense that it was quite unlikely to have
affected the result, appellate courts refuse to reverse. 131 The hearsay
studies are relevant to this policy issue even when they do not address
the question whether hearsay aids in reaching accurate verdicts. If
juries heavily discount hearsay, as some of the studies suggest, 132 then
the erroneous admission of hearsay (at least where it is substituted for
live testimony) should be considered prejudicial error less often.
The hearsay experiments reach divergent results, and without fur-
ther research we cannot be sure why. Based on the features of the ex-
tant studies, the reason might be a difference in the medium by which
the trial evidence was presented (written versus audio or videotaped).
Or it might have been a difference in whether or not the hearsay wit-
nesses were especially credible individuals (for instance, expert wit-
nesses). In some studies, the mode of presentation may have made it
particularly hard for jurors to realize they were dealing with hearsay, a
problem that is much less likely to occur in a trial. Another possibility
has to do with who the out-of-court declarant was. Substituting hearsay
adults for child declarants may be more acceptable to the mock jurors
than other hearsay because they could readily sympathize with the pos-
sible need for it. Because there are many different situations in which
hearsay can be offered, and different witnesses through whom it can be
offered—parties, police, informants, children, experts, to name a few—
it is hard to generalize. Indeed, the divergent results might have been
due to something else. In any event, the divergent results, the wide
range of circumstances in which hearsay issues can arise, and the dif-
ferences between the simulations and the actual courtroom environ-
ment, caution against deriving broad policy recommendations from the
experiments on hearsay impact.
Despite the reservations noted above concerning those three ba-
sic hearsay policy issues, the experiments are a good start in answering
131 See ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 12.2 (2d ed. 2001).
In See Kovera et al., supra note 115, at 719; Miene et al, supra note 115, at 691.
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more narrow questions. For example, the experiment by Warren and
Woodhal1 133 suggests the danger in admitting hearsay in the child wit-
ness context—persons interrogating child witnesses do not remember
accurately their mode of interrogation or whether they were sugges-
tive. The Pathak and Thomson experiments" indicates that when the
suggestive interrogation causes a complete change of story, the trier
of fact may be able to detect the truth even without realizing the full
danger of suggestiveness. Other experiments may be useful to lawyers
making strategic decisions, such as whether to substitute a hearsay
witness for a child witness. And, as has been the case with studies of
eyewitness testimony, the studies are more likely to be useful as they
multiply and converge. Studies examining particular hearsay dan-
gers—for example, the danger of suggestive questioning of child wit-
nesses—in particular situations are likely to be more useful than stud-
ies that attempt to answer the global question of whether hearsay is
good evidence.
But the studies that are available now are just a start. Hearsay is-
sues arise in many different contexts. A study that tests whether jurors
(or judges, for that matter) are successful in using hearsay evidence of
eyewitness identification will not necessarily tell you anything about
whether they would be successful in using hearsay accounts of medical
diagnosis or hearsay accounts of declarations by child witnesses. And
the purposes of cross-examination can be different in different situa-
tions, hence the use of hearsay will differ as an adequate substitute for
cross-examination. Hearsay might be an adequate substitute in situa-
tions in which the purpose of cross-examination is to show defects in
perception, but not where the purpose is to show deception. A hear-
say experiment that shows jurors successfully using hearsay from a
neutral declarant would not show that the jurors could detect a lying
declarant through the medium of a hearsay witness. 135
Consequently, it makes sense to approach the vast problem of
hearsay and its exceptions bit by bit, studying specific situations such
133 Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do
Interviewers Recall Their Interviews with Children?, 5 PSYCHOL, Pna. PoL'y & L. 355, 365-70
(1999).
14 Pathak & Thompson, supra note 112, at 386.
155 Suppose, for example, that a lawyer plans to cross-examine a lying police officer by
getting the police officer committed to the story that the officer had not used the N word
in the previous ten years, a story that the cross-examiner knows can be definitively dis-
proved. A study that shows one does not lose anything when one uses hearsay instead of a
neutral witness would not mean that one does not lose anything when one uses hearsay in
lieu of cross-examining Detective Fuhrman in the O.J. Simpson trial.
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as child witness interrogations and specific dangers such as insensitiv-
ity to suggestiveness. To get a good grip on it, there probably will need
to be hundreds of studies, as in the eyewitness area. Until then, poli-
cymakers seeking answers to questions such as whether the hearsay
rule should be abolished or modified in a particular class of situations
will have to continue to rely upon their traditional tools of history,
experience, and fireside induction, with occasional help from the
empirical research that is available.
In the preceding examples, psychological research and theory
were employed to test the assumptions underlying evidence doctrine.
That is, indeed, what most legal scholars have used psychology for.
But another role, one that awaits future development, is the possibility
that psychology could help to identify and explain existing regulari-
ties in evidence law: why, in the hands of common-law evidence rule-
makers, certain rules evolved and others did not. 136
III. LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
Law and forensic science has long been a topic of evidence
scholarship—the history of articles about new ways of gathering evi-
dence to prove the identity of suspected perpetrators is a long one." 7
But the flourishing of this field has been remarkable since the Su-
preme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
/nc. 138 Daubert's command to judges to do their own screening for sci-
entific validity rather than merely deferring to self-declared experts
has encouraged scholarship about whether expertise has been scien-
tifically tested, 139
 what the results of testing have been, 14° and how
well judges have been doing with the law and the science. 141
136
 An article that reflects this use of psychological knowledge to understand law, in-
cluding some aspects of the law of evidence, is Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological
Theory offudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998).
137
 See generally SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001).
136 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
139 See generally Comm. ON SCI. ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION
COMPARISON, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD
EVIDENCE (2004) [hereinafter WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE] (citing works); 4 MOD-
ERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102 (various chapters on various forensic sciences);
Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout from Supreme Court's
Decision in Kumho Tire, 14 CRIM. JUST. 12 (2000); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J.
Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gateketping, 44 Jo DUES' JOURNAL
16 (Fall 2005); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892 (2005).
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Daubert already has led to an astonishing amount of scholar-
ship 142 and has created a legal environment that will lead to even
more scholarly (as well as judicial) discussion of issues concerning the
scientific validity of scientific claims and forensic techniques. It
quickly gave birth to new treatises seeking to look at the world of sci-
entific evidence through the framework of Daubert. 143 These discus-
sions focus not only on issues of the legal admissibility of scientific
evidence, or other limitations that might be placed on it, but also on
the scientific basis for the evidence as required by Daubert and Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael.'" In the post-Daubert world, judges, lawyers, and
legal scholars cannot do their work properly without becoming scien-
tifically literate. 145
What lawyers, scholars, and the courts are discovering is that
some kinds of evidence, most notably some of the forensic sciences,
which had been all but unquestioned under older admissibility tests,
appeared to have startling weaknesses when viewed through the lens
Ironically, at the same time that judges, legal scholars, and scientists are inquiring into
the scientific foundations of forensic science, often finding them to be surprisingly weak,
popular culture is experiencing an upsurge of credulousness. See Janine Robben, The 'CS!'
Effect: Popular Culture and the Justice System, 66 OR. ST. B. But-L. 9, 9 (Oct. 2005).
140 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102, §§ 31;33:45.
"I See, e.g., Sophia 1. Gatowski, Shirley A. Dobbin, James T. Richardson, Gerald P.
Ginsburg, Mara L. Merlin() & Veronica Dahir, Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 451-
55 (2001); Jennifer L. Groscup, Steven D. Penrod, Christina A. Studebaker, Matthew T.
Huss & Kevin M. O'Neil, The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State
and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 339, 363-71 (2002); Joseph Sanders,
Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 Psy-
CHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 139, 152 (2002). See generally DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN,
JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN Sc RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVI-
DENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (2005); 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102.
142 A search of the Westlaw JLR database (journals and law reviews) on February 25,
2006, found 1492 articles citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and 5173 articles citing
Daubed.
1" See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 2000); MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102; MICHAEL J. SAKS, DAVID L.
FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE & JOSEPH SANDERS, ANNOTATED REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE, SECOND (2004).
I" Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-53 (1999) (applying Daubert to
engineers and other experts who are not scientists).
145 Efforts to assist them have taken the form of conferences, courses, CLE programs,
checklists, and works of the kind cited supra note 143. A good example of the need of
judges and lawyers to learn to think conceptually about scientific research is provided by
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert 's "Brave New
World": The Courts' Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Proficiency
Studies, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1247, 1282-84 (1995).
982	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 47:949
of the new test."6
 On the other side of the coin, and perhaps ironi-
cally, the new legal test might breathe new life into proffered poly-
graph examinations. Once courts must ask seriously about scientific
foundations of fields, they discover that more science and more re-
search exist concerning polygraph examination than about most or
all of the traditional forensic sciences. 147
 What courts should do with
the new realizations, what are the exact requirements of Daubert, and
what are or should be the contours of Daubert's exclusionary zone are
the subjects of countless articles.
Another important development in the area has been the rise
and success of DNA evidence. At first DNA evidence was accepted
blindly, 148
 like many other forensic sciences. 149 Then came the People
v. Castro case—real scientists got involved and criticized the method-
ology of the DNA labs, successfully. 190
 Subsequently, the issues of
methodology and fit were addressed and cleaned up. It now appears
that DNA analysis may, by example, fuel improvements in the rest of
forensic science, because its more careful and explicit scientific ap-
proach puts to shame so much of what previously had been accepted
as forensic expertise.' 51
 The advent of DNA typing has made the shaky
scientific foundations of the traditional forensic individualization sci-
ences all the more apparent. In addition, DNA-based exonerations of
persons who had been erroneously convicted are exposing the flaws
of the traditional forensic sciences,' 52
 just as they have already rein-
forced, in the eyes of policymakers, the findings of scientific studies
about the fallibility of eyewitness identification. 153
There already have been successful challenges to a form of ex-
pertise that, for most of the twentieth century, had been regarded as
148
 It turns out that these traditional identification techniques often are little more
than observation plus intuition (look and opine), with little and sometimes no scientific
underpinnings or testing of any of these fields' foundational questions, which they merely
beg. See 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102, §§ 31:33—:45; Michael J. Saks,
Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Sci-
ence, 49 HASTINGS U. 1069, 1094-127 (1998); Saks & Koehler, supra note 139, at 892.
147 See 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102, § 40.
148 Id. § 32:3 ("rapid and sometimes uncritical acceptance").
148 See generally Saks, supra note 146.
18° 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989); ,see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence
in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 52-53 (2001).
181 Michael .). Saks & Jonathan .). Koehler, What DNA 'Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law
About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 361 (1991).
185 See Saks & Koehler, supra note 139, at 893.
153
 EDWARD CONNORS, THOMAS LUNDREGAN, NEAL MILLER & Tom McEwErt, CONVICTED
BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTAB-
LISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 24 (1996); U.S. DEWT OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 3.
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being of settled admissibility—handwriting identification. 154 Similar
weaknesses can be found in microscopic hair identification, bite-
marks, toolmarks, and other areas of forensic identification. 155 Even
the holy grail of forensic science, fingerprinting, has been challenged.
We are not referring to rolled prints used to prove that a person once
arrested in Phoenix is the same person who is now on trial in San
Francisco, but rather the methods used in and assumptions relied
upon in comparing latent prints, lifted from crime scenes, with rolled
prints. The scientific basis for the claim that identification by latent
prints is infallible if established procedures are followed just does not
exist. 156 Most federal courts that have confronted this realization re-
sponded to it by manipulating the law to permit admission. 157 One
federal judge initially responded by limiting admission (excluding the
fingerprint expert's conclusion of identity, but allowing testimony
concerning the similarities and differences between the latent and
known prints) , 155 but later reversed himself and went the way of other
courts. 159 The issue has even begun to interest the general public.m
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the impact of the law's
new approach to scrutinizing purported scientific evidence has been
bullet lead analysis. Bullet lead analysis, in use since the 1960s, in-
volves the comparison of the chemical composition of a crime scene
bullet to the chemical composition of bullets found in the possession
of a suspect. 161 Debate over the technique throughout the 1990s ques-
tioned the theory behind it, and pointed out that experts often tes-
tified beyond what could be supported by available data. 16" The result-
ing debate ultimately led the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the
154 See D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE, supra note 102, § 35.
155 See generally 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102.
156 See id. § 34; Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubers: The Myth of Fingerprint "Sci-
ence" Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 622-49 (2002). See generally COLE, supra note 137.
157 See 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 102, §§ 34:3-:13.
155 United States v. Llera Plaza, No. CR 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *517-18 (ED.
Pa. Jan. 7, 2002); see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael,
J., dissenting) (explicating the shortcomings of fingerprint and handwriting expert evi-
dence).
159 United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Sup!). 2d 549, 560, 575-76 (ED. Pa. 2002)
(finding, nevertheless, that the ''science" of fingerprint identification suffered from major
shortcomings).
16° See Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96. That ar-
ticle predicts, accurately we think, that the issue is not going to go away. Id. at 105.
161 WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 139, at 8.
162 See William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative Is Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 26, 33-34 (2002).
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only practitioner of the technique) to discontinue it in 2005, based on
a review of the claims of this "science" produced by the National Re-
search Counci1. 163
In addition, there are important questions directed at what might
be regarded as the intersection of forensic science, law, and psychol-
ogy. What inferences do jurors draw from admitted expert testimony
on forensic science? Do they understand the evidence properly? Are
they misled by the testimony? Can the testimony be cabined in ways
that would correct any problems that are found?'64
Of course, classifications are always disputable, and some might
argue that the field of "law and forensic science" is really too small if it
embraces only the traditional forensic sciences, and that a better title
would be "law and the scientific method," because people who write
in this field also write about other Daubert topics, such as the admissi-
bility of epidemiological evidence, psychological syndrome evidence,
and so on. Certainly the scientization of law, and of society in general,
with or without Daubert, inevitably will lead to more evidence scholar-
ship about law and science of all kinds. 165
IV. THE "NEW EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP"—PROBABILITY AND PROOF
The term "New Evidence Scholarship," coined by Richard Lem-
pert, 166 is broad enough to cover all interdisciplinary scholarship or
even all innovative scholarship. But the term has most often been ap-
plied to scholarship on probability and proof, including evidence
163 See generally WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE, supra note 139.
164 Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising An-
swers, 76 JUDICATURE 222, 229 (1993); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical
Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 275-79 (1990); Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by
DNA Match Statistics?, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493, 508-10 (2001); Dale A. Nance & Scott
B. Morris, furor Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats
for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395,
418-36 (2005); Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 748-50 (1992).
165 In addition to the paradigm-shifting developments in traditional criminal iden-
tification, there will be new legal solutions as well as new problems brought by advances in
biotechnology, nano technology, and digital informatics, among other fields.
166
 Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof 66 B.U.
L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1986) ("Evidence is being transformed from a field concerned with
the articulation of rules to a field concerned with the process of proof. Wigmore's other
great work [THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF, cited infra note 168] is being rediscovered,
and disciplines outside the law, like mathematics, psychology and philosophy, are being
plumbed for the guidance they can give.").
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scholarship that applies formal tools of probability theory, such as
Bayes' Theorem. 167
Formal analysis of legal evidence is not a wholly new idea. Wig-
more's Science of Judicial Proof used symbols and charts as part of a sys-
tem of evidence analysis. 168 And there is a long, if intermittent, history
of interest in legal uses of statistics and basic probability theory: in the
Howland Will Case in the 1860s, for example, an eminent scholar used
the product rule in an attempt to calculate whether commonalities in
two signatures could have been coincidental. 169
But the word "new" is a fair one, at least in terms of the volume of
scholarship. Among the seminal works we can count John Kaplan's
1968 article on decision theory,'" Richard Eggleston's 1978 book en-
titled Evidence, Proof and Probability, 171 and Jonathan Cohen's 1977
challenge to the applicability of standard probability reasoning in le-
gal contexts. 112 The 1968 case of People v. Collins, 173 in which the
prosecution misused evidence of probabilities in an ingenious fash-
ion, stirred up interest in how probabilities might properly be used in
trials. The celebrated debate in the Harvard Law Review, 174 with Mi-
chael Finkelstein and William Fairley on one side and Laurence Tribe
on the other, no doubt inspired other scholars to pursue the topic,
167 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
169 See generally JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY
LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (3d
ed. 1937).
169 See Note, The Howland Will Case, 4 AM. L. REV. 625, 648-49 (1870) (recounting tes-
timony of Benjamin Peirce and his son, mathematician Charles S. Peirce). Other early
work included the rigorous and largely ignored efforts of Jerome Michael and Mortimer
Adler to trace the logic of proof. See Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler, Real Proof. I, 5
VAND. L. REv. 344 (1952); Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact:
1, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1224 (1934); Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler, The Trial of an Issue
of Fact: H, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1462 (1934). William Twining detected a "continuous intel-
lectual tradition from Bentham, through Wills, Best, Stephen, Thayer, Gulson, Wigmore,
Michael and Adler to Leo Levin, Irvin Rutter, and contemporary teachers of taw." See
TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 12, 15. Nonethe-
less, Twining recognized that by the 1970s the field of rigorous analysis of facts seemed
"rather neglected" and that there was almost no mention of topics such as epistemology
and probability theory in the standard texts on the law of evidence. Id. at 341-42.
17° John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065
(1968).
171 RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF AND PROBABILITY (1978).
177 L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 6 (1977).
173 438 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Cal. 1968).
174 Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evi-
dence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV, L. REV. 1329 (1971).
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even though Tribe's skepticism toward the practicality of using Bayes-
ian approaches at trial also may have had a dampening effect. William
Twining's calls to action no doubt also helped, 175 as did conferences
on New Evidence Scholarship organized by Peter Tillers.'" David
Schum, a nonlawyer, also deserves much credit for interesting law
professors in the formal analysis of evidence.'"
One "New Evidence" topic revolves around the question whether
standard probability logic is or ought to be consistent with judicial
fact finding. Sometimes naked statistical evidence seems intuitively
insufficient to justify a judgment. If the only proof that the plaintiff
was injured by the defendant's bus instead of another company's bus
was mere evidence that a majority of the blue busses in town belonged
to the defendant, many of us would hesitate to find that identification
sufficient. Or if the defendant was chosen at random from a crowd in
a rodeo, and was sued on a claim that he had not paid for his ticket,
we would hesitate to issue judgment based merely on proof that only
499 tickets had been sold and there were a thousand spectators, so
that defendant, chosen at random, had just over a 50% chance of be-
ing a gatecrasher. Does the fact that our intuition makes us cringe
from issuing judgment on these facts alone mean that the standard
logic of probability does not or should not apply to trials? 1 " Scholars
who are comfortable with using standard probability logic have pro-
vided many answers to the paradox, including the argument that if
that is all the plaintiff chooses to present then we cannot be sure that
175 See TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, passim
and 12-31, 341-72 (1990).
176 Professor Tillers was the chair (with Eric Green), the moderator, and a panelist at
the Boston University School of Law Symposium on Probability and Inference in the Law
of Evidence, April 4-6, 1986, and the organizer, the chair, and a panelist at the Cardozo
Conference on Decision and Inference in Litigation, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity, March 24-26, 1991. E-mail I from Peter Tillers, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Car-
dozo School of Law, to Roger C. Park (July 8, 2005) (on file with the authors). When con-
tacted, Professor Tillers also noted the influence of activities such as William Twining's
1982 conference on "Facts in Law" at Durham University and the honors seminars organ-
ized by Adrian Zuckerman at Oxford that started in 1984. E-mail II from Peter Tillers,
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to Roger C. Park (July 8, 2005) (on
file with the authors). For a European perspective on the development of the field, see
TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, passim and 349-50.
177 See genera145, Peter Tillers, Webs of Things in the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICR.
L. REV. 1225 (1989) (review of David A. SCht1M'S EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTEL.
LIGENCE ANALYST (1987), with comments on his contributions to the science of evidence).
178 See generally COHEN, supra note 172 (describing anomalies that arise if Pascalian
probability theory is applied in certain legal situations, and arguing that a "Baconian" ap-
proach would be more just).
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the probability is actually over 50%, because a negative inference can
be drawn from lack of other proof.'"
The conjunction problem raises similar questions. Standard in-
structions tell jurors that if they find each element to be true by a
preponderance of the evidence, they should find for the plaintiff. The
problem is that proving each element to be more probable than not
does not prove that the conjunction of all elements is more probable
than not. If we make the assumption that the elements are independ-
ent of each other, this instruction is technically inaccurate because if
there are two elements and the probability of each of them being true
is 60%, then the probability of both being true is .6 x .6, or 36%. Does
that mean that the standard logic of probability is inapposite, and that
we therefore must think of legal reasoning as proceeding from some
other basis? The conjunction problem is one reason why Professor
Allen has proposed reconceptualization of civil trials in a way that tells
juries to decide whose story is most believable, as opposed to telling
them to decide whether the plaintiff has established each element by
a preponderance of the evidence. 180
 Again, there are answers, includ-
ing the answer that jury instructions are often ambiguous on the
question whether it is sufficient merely to prove each element by a
preponderance, and that instructions sometimes suggest that the joint
occurrence of all elements must be proven. 181
 Moreover, the ap-
proach of telling juries to judge the relative plausibility of the parties'
stories would lead to its own anomalies. Suppose, for example, the
defendant tells one story, the plaintiff tells a slightly more plausible
119 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1508-10 (1999). Judge Posner also argues that, even if other evidence cannot be
obtained, the cost of trying such marginal cases outweighs the benefits. Id. at 1510. For
further discussion of the general topic of "naked statistical evidence," see Daniel Shaviro,
Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 Ilway. L. REV. 530, 533-36
(1989) [hereinafter Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice]. See
generally Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Mats: A Clarifica-
tion of the Walled Statistical Evidence" Debate, The Meaning of 'Evidence,' and the Requirement of
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 65 Tut- L. REV. 1093 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication
and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 Tut,. L. REV. 457 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Re-
sponse to Professor Allen, 65 Tut.. L. REV. 1111 (1991) [hereinafter Shaviro, A Response to Pro-
fessor Allen]; Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Caller?, 65 'Fut., L. REV. 499 (1991) [here-
inafter Shaviro, A Response to Professor Callen].
181) Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 425-37
(1986).
181
	 Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical Interpretation
of the Logic of Trials, 66 B. U. L Rev. 947, 949-52 (1986).
988	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 47:949
story, and the jury believes that a third story not offered by either
party (but favoring the defendant) is the true one. 182
Another topic, the use of Bayes' Theorem to evaluate evidence
and evidence law, has become one of the centerpieces of the New
Evidence Scholarship. 1s3 Bayes' Theorem is a basic tenet of probabil-
ity theory that can be used to adjust a probability assessment upon
receiving new evidence. For example, imagine a case in which the is-
sue is whether the defendant is the source of a hair found at a crime
scene. After hearing testimony of lay witnesses, the factfinder forms
an opinion that the odds are 2 to 1 that the defendant is the source of
the hair. In addition, there is expert testimony that mitochondrial
DNA (mtDNA) sequencing shows that the hair has a genetic profile
that has a population frequency of 1%. The defendant's hair matches
that profile. Bayes' Theorem would provide a way of updating the
prior estimate of 2-to-1 odds with the new information of the match.
In the above example, the probability of this test result, given a
defendant who is not the source of the hair, is 1 in 100, which is the
random match probability in the general population. That does not
mean, however, that there is a 1 in 100 probability that the defendant
is the source, given the mtDNA test results. The error of confusing
these two probabilities is known as "transposing the conditional."
The following example illustrates the error of transposing the
conditional. The probability that a person has committed a crime,
given that he is in prison, Pr(C I P), is obviously not the same as the
probability that a person is in prison, given that he has committed a
crime, Pr(P I C). The latter probability is much lower, considering that
not all criminals are caught and that not all crimes are punished with
incarceration. To believe that Pr(C P) must be equal to Pr(P I C) is
the error of transposing the conditional.
Another way to understand the error of transposing the condi-
tional is to suppose that there is absolutely no evidence against the
defendant except the mtDNA test on the hair. Suppose there are
100,000 other people living in the vicinity and no reason except the
mtDNA finding to point a finger at the defendant instead of one of
the others. Suppose also that the defendant's genetic profile matches
and the probability of a random match is 1%. In other words, the
182
 See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1551,1575
-80 (2001). For another discussion, see Posner, supra note 179, at 1512- 15.
153
 For a useful introduction, see generally David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathe-
matically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741 (1990).
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probability of a match, given that the defendant is not the source, is
1%. That does not mean that the probability the defendant is not the
source, given that there is a match, is only 1%. One would expect, out
of the 100,000 other possible suspects, that 1,000 of them would also
match. If so, the probability that the defendant is not the source,
given a match, is closer to 99.9% than to 1%. 184
 Of course, the prob-
ability, that the defendant is not the source would decrease dramati-
cally once other inculpatory evidence is offered, such as testimony
that the defendant had a motive and was seen near the crime scene.
A factfinder who used Bayes' Theorem to take account of the
mtDNA test could arrive at a probability that the defendant is the
source without falling into transposition error. Suppose again that the
factfinder estimates the prior odds that the defendant was the source
(before the DNA test) to be 2 to 1. That factfinder could multiply the
prior odds by a statistic called the "likelihood ratio" to obtain the pos-
terior odds (the revised estimate of the odds the defendant was the
source, after taking the mtDNA test into account). The likelihood ra-
tio is derived by dividing the probability of finding the evidence of a
match, given that the defendant is the source, by the probability of
finding it, given that the defendant is not the source. Assume that the
probability of finding a match, given that the defendant is the source,
is 100%. 185 If the defendant is not the source, the probability of find-
ing a match is 1/100 or 1% (the probability of a random match in the
general population). 186 The likelihood ratio therefore is 100% di-
vided by 1%, or 100. To calculate the posterior odds, one would mul-
154 For purposes of the example, we are ignoring the possibility that someone not liv-
ing in the vicinity is the source.
185 This assumption is not logically compelled. It would not be valid, for example, if
laboratory error were taken into account, or if hairs from the same person could have
different mtDNA profiles. But here we assume that we would find a match every time if the
hair came from the defendant.
1136 These assumptions require that we ignore the danger of laboratory error. Putting
the danger of lab error aside is controversial among scholars, even in the usual case in
which frequency evidence is presented without any Bayesian interpretation. The factfinder
may be prejudiced when an extremely small match probability is presented without incor-
porating (or even estimating) the danger that a match might occur through lab error. On
the other hand, it seems reasonable to consider one thing at a time (first what the evi-
dence shows assuming no lab error, then the danger of lab error in the specific case).
Compare Jonathan J. Koehler, Audrey Chia & Samuel Lindsey, The Random Match Probability
in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 juulmETascs J. 201 (1995), and Jonathan J.
Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a National Researds
Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 junsmemics J. 425 (1997) with Margaret A. Berger,
Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081
(1997).
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tiply the prior odds of 2 to 1 by the likelihood ratio of 100. Thus, the
factfinder using this method would conclude that the updated odds
that the defendant was the source are 200 to 1.
In an article published early in the Bayesian debate, Finkelstein
and Fairly suggested using Bayes' Theorem to aid jurors in cases in
which the issue is the identity of the perpetrator and the perpetrator
has left trace evidence at the scene of the crime.'" They constructed
a hypothetical case in which the accused is charged with murdering
his girlfriend, and the perpetrator of the crime left behind a hand
print. 188
 They illustrated how Bayes' Theorem could be used to get
from the random match probability (the frequency of handprint fea-
tures in the general population) to an estimate of how likely it was
that the defendant left the print at the scene." 9
In a celebrated reply, Professor Laurence Tribe, then an evidence
teacher, raised several objections to this use of Bayes' Theorem in the
trial process. 190
 Jurors who are not proposition bettors might have
mistaken or inconsistent understandings of the meaning of prior
probability."' There is a danger of "[d]warfing [s] oft [v]ariables,'
that is, the danger that the impressiveness of statistics would obscure
other issues (such as whether there might be an innocent explanation
for the presence of the print). 192
 Moreover, uncertainty about facts
upon which the Bayesian calculations would be based could require
additional quantification decisions about so many issues that use of
the Theorem would be more confusing than helpful. 193 If there is a
danger that the expert might be mistaken about the frequency of the
print, for example, that would have to be taken into account some-
how, but it would not be easy for a factfinder to adjust the statistics.
Tribe's analysis was in turn criticized by psychologists for making
1 " See generally Finkelstein Sc Fairley, supra note 174.
m Id. at 496.
fd. at 498-500.
190 Tribe, supra note 174, at 1358-77.
191
 Tribe pointed out that to some jurors a probability of .50 might stand for what the
chances were before any evidence was introduced, while to others it might mean that the
search has to be narrowed to two suspects. Id. at 1358-59.
m Id. at 1361-65.
1 " For Bayes' Theorem to be helpful in the hypothetical described by Finkelstein and
Fairley, one has to assume that the person whose handprint is on the knife is guilty of be-
ing the killer, and that the handprint expert is accurate. A factfinder who believed that
these two facts were not certain would have to discount the probability estimate obtained
by using Bayes' Theorem, and giving instructions about how to do this would be too com-
plicated to be feasible. Id.
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faulty psychological assumptionsl" as well as by statisticians,'" phi-
losophers, 196 and legal scholars. 1"
Bayesian skeptics have continued to point out problems with the
use of Bayes in the trial process. Progressive updating using Bayes'
Theorem throughout the trial would be so computationally complex
that it would be beyond the capacity of the factfinder. Moreover, trials
are structured in such a way that the jury does not receive informa-
tion in a way that facilitates Bayesian updating. For example, the jury
might have difficulty formulating prior probability assessments when
it does not get instructions about the law until the end, and hence
does not know exactly what proposition it is supposed to decide. 198
To some extent, Bayesian enthusiasts and Bayesian skeptics seem
to be talking past each other. The skeptics have demonstrated that it is
not practical to use Bayesian analysis very often in the course of trial,
but most of the enthusiasts do not argue for such a use. 199 Bayesians
often emphasize the value of Bayesian reasoning outside the heat of
trial, in assessing the value of rules excluding evidence or in weighing
the probative value of certain types of evidence. 200 A basic Bayesian
perspective asks about the degree to which new evidence changes our
estimate of the odds of a fact being true, and tells us to compare the
likelihood of finding the evidence if the fact were true with the likeli-
hood of finding it if the fact were false. 261 it can, for example, help us
understand why prior convictions have little probative value in im-
104 David L. Faigman & Ad. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV, 1 , 13-14 (1988); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Process-
ing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 123, 123-45 (1980); Brian C.
Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger C. Park, Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence,
20 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 49, 78 (1996).
195 Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT . L .1, EVIDENCE &
PROOF 276, 285-86 (1996).
1 " COHEN, supra note 172, at 53-56.
19r
	
E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the
Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 784-86
(1986).
igs See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Judicial Proof A Preliminary Inquiry, 1
INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 254, 265-69 (1997); Mike Redmayne, Presenting Probabilities in
Court: The DNA Experience, I INT' t. J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 187, 199-208 (1997) (although
Professor Redmayne suggests with "some trepidation" that Bayesian presentations will be
appropriate in some cases, id. at 213, his article acknowledges and illustrates practical and
conceptual difficulties); see also Alex Stein, Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian Method: The
Case for Deeper Skepticism About Their Combination, I J. EvinEbrcz & PROOF 25, 34-47
(1997).
199 Friedman, supra note 195, at 290.
"I Id.
201 Id.
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peaching the testimony of the accused in a criminal case. 202 Learning
of the evidence of the prior conviction does not change our prior es-
timate of the odds that the defendant would lie. If he is guilty of a se-
rious charge, the situational pressures to lie are so strong that even a
generally honest person likely would lie to escape punishment; learn-
ing the fact that he was dishonest on an earlier occasion does not
change the odds much. If he is innocent of the charged crime, the
situational pressures are likely to push him toward telling the truth
even if he is a veteran liar, and, anyway, it does not much matter if he
lies his way out of a false charge. Of course, one could arrive at the
same insight without knowledge of Bayes' Theorem, but it seems
likely that exposure to the approach helps us be sensitive to the right
factors in assessing probative value. 2" Similarly, a Bayesian perspective
can help us understand why evidence that a man accused of murder-
ing his wife had beaten her on previous occasions is probative, despite
the fact that spousal abuse is common and that very few abusers pro-
gress to murder. 204
 Scholars also have relied on Bayesian models to
analyze such diverse evidentiary issues as the meaning of the concept
of relevance, 205
 the value of forensic identification evidence, 206
 the
proper interpretation of DNA evidence, 20
 the value of expert testi-
mony in child abuse cases, 208
 the value of hearsay, 2" and the appro-
priateness of questioning children in a suggestive manner. 21°
202 See Friedman, supra note 23, at 659-66; Posner, supra note 179, at 1526-27,1533- ,
35. Professor Uviller arrived at a similar conclusion without reference to Bayes' Theorem.
See Uviller, supra note 23, at 867-68 ("[I] t seems quite likely that a guilty person without
prior convictions will lie on the stand as readily as will a guilty veteran, while innocent
people with extensive criminal histories will testify as truthfully as the innocent novice.").
202 See generally Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Micit. L. REV. 1021 (1977)
[hereinafter Lempert, Modeling Relevance]; Richard Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes, and the As If
World of Evidence Law, 1 INT'LJ. EVIDENCE & PROOF 316 (1997).
"4
 Richard D. Friedman & Roger C. Park, Sometimes What Everybody Thinks They Know Is
True, 27 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 629,637 n.15 (2003).
2D5 Lempert, Modeling Relevance, supra note 203, at 1021-32.
296
 BERNARD ROBERTSON & GA. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE 16-29 (1995).
2° 7
 See generally IAN W. EvErr & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATIS-
TICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (1998).
20g Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative
Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELI. L. REV. 43,46-50 (1996).
2°9
 Peter Tillers & David Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 MINN. L. REV. 813,832-52 (1992).
210 Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Re-
search and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33,76-81 (2000). For other examples of
applications of Bayes in evaluation of evidence law, see generally Richard D. Friedman,
Towards a (Bayesian) Convergence?, 1 INT'LJ. EVIDENCE & PROOF 348 (1997).
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A number of Bayesian enthusiasts believe that the Theorem can be
useful at trial, though few would argue for applying Bayesian analysis
iteratively to discrete pieces of evidence. For example, in a DNA case
one might aggregate all the non-DNA evidence, assign prior odds, and
then multiply by a likelihood ratio derived from the DNA evidence.
How to combine the evidence might be demonstrated to the jury either
by using a chart showing prior and posterior odds under different as-
sumptions about prior odds, or by telling them to multiply the prior
odds by the likelihood ratio. 211
 This approach is still problematic, for
reasons discussed by Tribe 212 and Allen,213
 and courts have been slow to
adopt it. 214 Proponents of decision aids have nonetheless made some
progress. In paternity cases, for example, some courts have allowed
charts to be provided to jurors showing how a prior probability of pa-
ternity should be revised in light of the paternity index (likelihood ra-
tio) associated with a genetic test. 215 Experts sometimes use Bayes'
Theorem in calculating an estimate of paternity that they then offer to
the trier as the probability of paternity, though this procedure is con-
troversial among scholars because it involves making an artificial as-
sumption that the prior probability of paternity is 50%. This assump-
tion is made without taking into account the actual non-test evidence,
so that the 50% figure would be used even if there were convincing
evidence that the defendant was sterile. 216 The National Research
211 See Nance, supra . note 182, at 1610-16; Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empiri-
cal Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable
Random Match Probability, 92 JURIMETRICS J. 903, 437-45 (2002). For advocacy of the ap-
proach of telling the trier about the likelihood ratio and explaining how to use it to com-
bine DNA evidence with other evidence, see Geoffrey K. Chambers, Stephen J. Cordiner,
John S. Buckleton, Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Forensic DNA Profiling: The Impor-
tance of Giving Accurate Answers to the Right Questions, 8 GRIM. L.F. 445, 956-59 (1997); see
also ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra note 206, at 20-21, 51-65 (supporting an approach .
under which a forensic expert explains to the trier of fact that "[t]his evidence is R times
more probable if the accused left the mark than if someone else did," and that "Whig evi-
dence therefore [very strongly] supports the proposition that the accused left the mark").
212 Tribe, supra note 174, at 1355-78.
213 Allen, supra note 198, at 265-69.
214 On the infrequency of use of these Bayesian presentation methods except in pater-
nity cases, see D.H. KAYE ET AL., supra note 141, § 12.4.2(6), at 478 ("[L]ikelihood ratios
are rarely introduced in criminal cases ....").
212 D.H. Kaye, Piemel as a Primer on Proving Paternity, 24 WnatAmerrE L. REV. 867, 881
(1988).
212 See, e.g., Kammer v. Young, 535 A.2d 936, 938-40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (affirm-
ing judgment in case in which expert, pursuant to command of Maryland statute, gave
opinion as to probability of paternity based on Bayesian calculation with assumed prior
odds of .5). For criticism of this approach, see ROBERTSON & VIGNAUX, supra note 206, at
25-27; Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising An-
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Council has suggested that experts might compute posterior probabili-
ties to show jurors the power of DNA evidence for establishing iden-
tity, 217
 although this proposal also remains controversia1. 218
When Bayesian skeptics and Bayesian enthusiasts address com-
mon ground, there seems to be a degree of convergence. Professor
Allen, a leading Bayesian skeptic, has allowed that "there may very
well be situations involving virtually purely statistical evidential bases
in which Bayes' theorem would be a useful analytic tool," and that
"the Bayesian skeptic does not deny a use for Bayes' Theorem as an
analytical tool." 219
 Professor Friedman, a leading enthusiast, has writ-
ten that, at least in cases in which statistical evidence does not other-
wise play a substantial role, there is "usually no substantial reason to
make an explicit presentation of probability theory; factfinders can
deal with the evidence much as they deal with ordinary questions in
their everyday lives. " 220
Some of the Bayesian debaters are more prone to thought ex-
periments than to empirical research, but there have been efforts to
test whether jurors are intuitive Bayesians and whether Bayesian
charts or instructions will aid decision making. Numerous studies
have shown that most of the time human beings do not behave ac-
cording to the Bayesian idea1. 221
 Generally, humans are too conserva-
tive, failing to adjust their prior estimates to the degree required by
Bayesian models of rational decision making. In a more fundamental
way, Bayesian modeling fails to capture the decision processes of hu-
man decisionmakers. Jurors appear to evaluate evidence in a trial not
swers, 76 Junto/multi: 222, 225-26 (1993). Of course, in many cases the 50% assumed prior
probability is generous to the defendant, and in any event the artificiality of the assump-
tion could be brought out on cross-examination and the expert asked to calculate the
probability of paternity based on other assumptions.
217
 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 199-202
(1996).
21° William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Sec-
ond Report On Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JuRtmEnlics 405, 422-23 (1997).
212
 Allen, supra note 198, at 258.
22°
 Friedman, supra note 195, at 290; see also John A. Michon, The Time Has Come to Put
This Debate Aside and Move On to Other Matters, 1 INTI, J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 331, 334
(1997).
221 Faigrnan & Baglioni, supra note 194, at 13-16; Jane Coodman,furars' Comprehension
and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 384-89 (1992); Jason
Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 178-82 (1999); Smith et al., supra note 194; at 73-78; William
C. Thompson '& Edward L Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Thais:
The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 181-85
(1987).
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by sequential updating but by constructing plausible narratives that
might account for the evidence. 222 As some researchers have con-
cluded, humans are story tellers, not meter readers. But in cases in
which the human story is supplemented by forensic match evidence,
there is some empirical evidence that human decision making might
be improved, or at least might come closer to the Bayesian norm, by
use of a Bayesian chart showing the trier how estimates of prior prob-
ability should be changed by the forensic evidence. 223
Another thrust of the "New Evidence Scholarship" is concerned
with inference and decision making in litigation, with the problem of
processing evidence and drawing inferences from it in order to pre-
pare for trial, to try cases, and to decide them. It seeks to develop
theories of inference in the litigation context. 224 This area of scholar-
ship is concerned with the problem of how lawyers can organize the
mass of evidence in a case in a meaningful and effective way to be
persuasive to factfinders. How are lawyers to sort through the maze of
evidence to determine which propositions that need to be proved are
supported by what evidence, in a complex interconnected hierarchy
of raw facts, intermediate inferences, and ultimate conclusions?
Wigmore225 developed the first system for organizing and assess-
ing evidence for litigation by employing careful logic to trace the fac-
tual support for inferences. "Wigmorian analysis is an attempt to cap-
ture the way we think when we think at our best." 226 Wigmorian
charting was a major milestone in lawyerly thinking about facts, but it
still was somewhat crude. Anderson and Twining227 not only resur-
rected Wigmorian charting, but improved upon it, such as by ena-
bling it to take into account the applicable substantive law and by ex-
panding it beyond requiring the chartist to have a single ultimate
probandum in mind before starting. Instead, the chartist is able to ex-
plore alternative conclusions to which the evidence might lead. Wig-
222 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of furor Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARoozo L. REV. 519, 549-50 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Explaining the Evidence: ?Nis of the Story Model for furor Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 202-03 (1992).
223 See Nance, supra note 182, at 1610-16; Nance & Morris, supra note 211, at 437-45.
"4 William Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship, 13 CARDOZO L REV. 295, 295 (1991).
For a leading example, see generally Peter Tillers & David Schum, A Theory of Preliminary
Fact Investigation, 24 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 931 (1991).
223 WIGMORE, supra note 168.
226 Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Taking Fact Analysis Seriously, 91 MICR. L. REV.
1442, 1447 (1993).
227 TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: HOW TO Do
THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OFJODICIAL PROOF, passim (1991).
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morian and related kinds of charting 228
 clarify the elements of evi-
dence and their inter-relationships. Moreover, the addition of an ele-
ment to the chart is an implicit probability judgment of the element's
importance. It is a small step to add quantified probability statements
either of the empirical kind or the chartist's subjective probability of
the element. 229
We should add a brief mention of evidence scholars who have
addressed philosophical issues about the foundations of knowledge.
At least three distinguished evidence scholars have assessed the sig-
nificance of philosophical skepticism to the law of evidence. Despite
some differences, they essentially have concluded that lawyers and
evidence scholars need not worry about the implications of profound
skepticism. 2" The basic suppositions of a system of litigation require
rejecting profound skepticism, even if one sees goals other than truth
finding to be central.
There is, however, a debate about the extent to which we should
enthrone truth finding as the central goal of evidence law and believe
that the goal can be accomplished. Professor William Twining has
noted and described the tradition of "optimistic rationalism" in evi-
dence law and evidence scholarship. 231 Professor Seigel has argued
that philosophical pragmatism is a better foundation for thinking
about evidence than optimistic rationalism. He posits that the ration-
alist tradition has caused too great an emphasis on truth finding,
causing theorists to underestimate the value of other goals, such as
229 Namely, the improvements offered by ANDERSON & TWINING, id., and by such de-
vices as decision trees, influence diagrams, and aayes networks. See generally Robertson &
Vignaux, supra note 226.
229
 Robertson & Vignaux, supra note 226, at 1456.
230 See WILLIAM TWINING, Some Scepticism About Some Scepticisms, in RETHINKING EVI-
DENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 92, 94, 134 (stating that few philosophers
consistently maintain philosophical skepticism, and the literature "poses few threats to the
centrality of the concepts of Truth, Reason and justice in any theory of Evidence"); Ronald
J. Allen, Truth and Its Rivals, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 315-318 (1998) ('There is indeed an
important philosophical puzzle, but it primarily is how to explain what is obviously true."
Id. at 315. "[TJ he implications of scepticism for the legal system are marginal at best" be-
cause all the rivals to truth as a goal of litigation themselves involve rejection or cabining
of the philosophical problem of scepticism. Id. at 317.); Mirjan Damaika, Truth in Adjudica-
tion, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 290 (1998) (suiting that "when we engage in ... adjudication,
we presuppose a world beside our statements," and arguing that radical postmodern
thought has no bearing on evidence law). But cf. Donald Nicolson, Truth, Reason, and jus-
tice Epistemology and Politics in Evidence Discourse, 57 Moo. L. REV. 726, 743-44 (1994).
Nicolson's arguments are critiqued in Jackson, supra note 1, at 898-99.
231 See WILLIAM TWINING, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RETHINKING
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 32, 33,
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making verdicts more acceptable to the public and ending disputes in
an efficient way. 252 In contrast, and without relying to the same degree
upon the literature on philosophy, Professor Nesson has argued that
the legal system already gives primacy to making verdicts acceptable
instead of to finding the truth. 233
Professors Allen and Leiter have sought to bring lawyers up to
date on epistemology in an exploration of contemporary work on
naturalized epistemology. 234 Though their work is tough sledding for
readers without a background in philosophy, it reaches conclusions
that should be comforting to interdisciplinary evidence scholars. Al-
len and Leiter themselves note that "[I] or the great bulk of eviden-
tiary scholars, then, this paper merely solidifies the ground beneath
their feet. "235 They maintain that philosophy should not be an a priori
discipline, but one that is continuous with an a posteriori inquiry in
the empirical sciences. 2  They approve of a functional approach to
evidence law, assessing the wisdom of rules in light of their social ef-
fects, and using the tools of social science to study consequences of
legal rules: hypotheses should be tested empirically and discarded in
the face of disconfirming data. Their illustrations of this proposition
include criticism of some of Judge Posner's speculative conclusions
about the economics of evidence law. 237 Finally, because naturalized
epistemology is instrumental, evidence rules should only require in-
tellectual performances that factfinders are capable of doing—"ought
implies can"--a position that they see as militating against searches
for formal "algorithms," such as Bayes' Theorem, for use in fact find-
ing at trial.m
232 Seigel, supra note 117, at 996-99. For comments on critiques of the rationalist tradi-
tion, see Jackson, supra note 1, at 898-901.
233 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Ver-
dicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357,1359-68 (1985). For critique, see generally Ronald J. Allen,
Rationality, Mythology, and the Acceptability of Verdicts' Thesis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 541 (1986).
234 See generally Allen & Leiter, supra note 2.
233 Id. at 1493.
"8 Id. at 1494-97.
"7 Id. at 1503,1511,1516-25.
238 Id. at 1492-93,1499. For a rebuttal, see generally Nance, supra note 182. CI Brian
Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for
Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803,815-19 (arguing that Daubert makes un-
realistic demands on the epistemic capacities of adjudicators).
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V. FEMINIST EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP
Since 1990, an increasing number of law review articles have ex-
amined evidence law from a feminist perspective. Most of this scholar-
ship has dealt with evidence doctrines that relate to sexual assault and
spousal abuse. Topics relating to sexual assault have addressed rape
shield rules, 239
 exceptions to the rule against character evidence for
prior crimes of the alleged perpetrator, 24° and admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome testimony. 241 Topics concerning spousal abuse have
included whether victims should be forced to testify over a claim of
spousal immunity, 242
 whether prior acts of domestic violence against
other victims should be admissible, 243
 and whether social science evi-
dence in spousal abuse cases, including testimony about battered
woman's syndrome, should be admissible. 244 Feminist scholars also
239
 See generally Orenstein, supra note 19 (supporting rape shield legislation but oppos-
ing legislation admitting prior sex crimes of the alleged perpetrator).
24° See generally Baker, supra note 19; Orenstein, supra note 19.
241 Compare Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implication for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 398
(1985) ("[Rape trauma syndrome] evidence can help the fact finder resolve difficult issues
of guilt or innocence and ... such evidence can educate jurors and judges, which may
help correct erroneous social attitudes about the crime of rape."), with Susan Stefan, The
Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1271, 1277 (1994) ("The introduction of rape trauma syndrome evidence in criminal trials
has probably assisted in convicting rapists, but at the cost of reinforcing the very myths and
assumptions that early feminists fought so hard to eliminate.").
242
 For scholars who have urged that the victim not be allowed to invoke spousal im-
munity to refuse to testify against a battering husband, see generally Cheryl Hanna, No
Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L.
REv. 1849 (1996) (favoring mandated victim participation in domestic violence cases for a
variety of reasons, including deterrence and the educative function of the law) and Ma-
linda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Via.
fence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032 (1996) (the husband is likely to coerce the wife into not testi-
fying, and treating the matter as "private" violates feminist norms).
245 See generally Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and
Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359 (1996) (arguing for admis-
sion to combat gender bias, educate jury about nature of batterers, and overcome prob-
lems caused by lack of other evidence and coerced nonparticipation by victims); Lisa A.
Lipsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the Criminal Prosecution: A Common Sense
Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 73 (1995); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domes-
tic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1996).
244
 Battered woman's syndrome ("BWS") testimony, as represented in the work of Lenore
Walker, is sometimes offered into evidence to explain the conduct of women who kill their
husbands. See generally LENoRE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME]. Walker posits that women who do not leave their battering husbands
are experiencing learned helplessness," a phenomenon similar to that experienced by dogs
in an experiment where dogs that could not control the electric shocks they were receiving
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have examined evidence issues whose impact on women is less obvi-
ous, including the excited utterance exception, 245 the party admission
doctrine, 246 the use of inconsistent statements to impeach, 247 and the
increased rigor Daubert demands of expert testimony. 248
simply stopped trying to avoid them. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra, at
86, BWS theory has been criticized both as degrading to women and as based on poor social
science methodology, a criticism to which the present authors subscribe. Cf. Myrna S. Raeder,
The DoubleEdged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and Against Batterers in Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. Cow. L. REV. 789, 797 (1996) (noting deficiencies in em-
pirical support for Walker's cycle of violence thesis, but saying that "acceptance of the cycle is
justified in cases where the factual foundation supports its existence in the particular rela-
tionship in question"). See generally 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE., supra note 102, § 15
(reviewing the empirical research on which BWS theory is based); Erica Beecher-Monas,
Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47 LOY. L REV. 81
(2001) (criticizing BWS as degrading and methodologically flawed, and advocating admis-
sion of social context evidence and post-traumatic stress disorder testimony); David L. Faig-
man & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L REV. 67
(1997); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of Social Science Evi-
dence in Criminal Casts, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41 (2001) (arguing that feminists
seek admission of social science evidence that fails the Daubert test, and asserting that this
goal is pursued at the expense of socially disadvantaged criminal defendants, such as young
African-American males). Some authors have suggested substitutes, such as admitting evi-
dence of social science findings about domestic abuse. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way:
The Role of Batterers' Profiles and Expert "Social Framework" Background in Cases ImplicatingDomestic
Violence, 68 U. Cot.o. L. REV. 147, 151-52 (1997).
245 See generally Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAI, L. REV. 159 (1997) (excited utterance exception re-
flects male perspective; calm statements of sexual assault victims should also be admissible,
subject to conditions).
246 See generally Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into
Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221 (1999) (contending
that apologies should, like offers of compromise and remedial measures, be protected
from use against the apologizer). The role of apologies has become a topic of considerable
interest at the intersection of evidence and torts. See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L REV. 460 (2004).
247 In two articles, Kim Lane Scheppele has argued that the law gives too much cre-
dence to initial stories to the derogation of revised versions of events, one example being
the use of prior statements to impeach. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The Ground-Zero
Theory of Evidence, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 321 (1998) [hereinafter Scheppele, Ground-Zero]; Kim
Lane Scheppele, just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision
of truth, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 123 (1992) [hereinafter Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am].
245 See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L REV. 171,
211 (1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law] (favoring an ap-
proach to expert testimony that allows "all relevant voices on perspectives" to be heard,
and stating that "informing the jury about weaknesses in certain social science evidence
and allowing it to be admitted subject to certain reliability safeguards may often be prefer-
able to a flat exclusionary rule if the social science helps to convey an excluded group's
voice"). See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foun-
dations, 5 Mica. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998) thereinafter Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social
Scientific Evidence].
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A number of feminist evidence scholars, noting that scholars
from different strands of feminism might have different views about
law, have classified feminist legal theory into three categories. 249 The
first is liberal feminism, sometimes dubbed "sameness" feminism. Lib-
eral feminists are said to favor formal equality with men and assume
that women can compete in the same way as men; they do not empha-
size differences between men and women. 25° Radical feminists, some-
times called "dominance" feminists, see patriarchy and male domina-
tion of women, especially sexual domination, as the key to
understanding modern society and its laws. 251 A third strain of femi-
nism, sometimes called "difference" feminism or "cultural" feminism,
notes differences between men and women and argues for the legiti-
macy or superiority of the female perspective. 252 These authors ex-
press a wide variety of views, some of them shared with strains of criti-
cal legal theory or postmodernism. These views include valuing
Some feminist scholars question the methodological rigor to which good science as-
pires and they advocate—to greater or lesser degrees—more intuitive, contextual, narra-
tive, and relational paths to knowledge. One of the more extreme statements of this view is
offered by Catharine MacKinnon:
If feminism is a critique of the objective standpoint as male, then we also dis-
avow standard scientific norms as the adequacy criteria for our theory, be-
cause the objective standpoint we criticize is the posture of science. In other
words, our critique of the objective standpoint as male is a critique of science
as a specifically male approach to knowledge. With it, we reject male criteria
for verification.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 54 (1987). One can also find traces of
an ascientific attitude in articles that assess the validity or social value of battered women's
testimony on grounds other than standard measures of scientific validity. See Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L REV.
1,42 (1991); cf. Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413,445-47.
One need not look far for examples of errors resulting from poor research design that
have had profoundly detrimental effects on women. A recent example is provided by de-
velopments in knowledge about hormone replacement therapy. Less rigorous research
design (observational) led to the belief that estrogen replacement was beneficial. Better
research design (experimental) eventually revealed that such treatment was dangerous,
but not before decades of misguided estrogen replacement had caused tens of thousands
of unnecessary breast cancers, heart attacks, and strokes in women. JERRY AVORN, POWER-
FUL MEDICINES: DIE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 23-38 (2004).
249 See Seymore, supra note 242, at 1066-70 (dividing the feminist legal movement into
"liberal feminism," "relational feminism," and "radical feminism"); Taslitz, What Feminism
Has to Offer Evidence Law, supra note 248, at 175-76 {dividing into liberal feminism," "radi-
cal feminism," and "cultural feminism"); cf. Orenstein, supra note 246, at 226-27 (dividing
into "difference feminism," "dominance feminism," and "postmodern feminism").
25° Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, supra note 248, at 176.
251 Id. at 175.
252 Id.
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intuition and emotion; believing in contextualized thinking instead of
abstract, rigid rules; and emphasizing the value of relationships over
market-like competition. 255
Some feminist scholars emphasize the value of narratives over, or
as an equal partner with, quantitative social science. 254 Others have
reservations about the public-private distinction, arguing that it has
been used to shield the abuse of women by treating what goes on in
the home as a private matter, beyond the reach of the law. 255 Many
scholars are attentive to the law's constitutive role in helping define
society and perpetuate views of the world. 256
 Sometimes one also sees
a belief in the pervasiveness and inevitability of politics, and a result-
oriented approach that deprecates the wisdom or feasibility of achiev-
ing objective solutions to social problems. 257 The "cultural" strand of
feminism seems to present the most obvious challenge to what Wil-
liam Twining called the tradition of "optimistic rationalism" in evi-
dence scholarship. 258
The influence of this strand of feminism on specific doctrinal
reform is likely to be limited until the rest of the world changes, how-
ever, because of a tension between the results of a conflict resolution
model based on cultural feminism and the more immediate goal of
fair outcomes for women litigants. An emphasis on contextualized
decision making that explores all of the relational nuances of a situa-
253
 Kinports summarized some of these differences as follows: "Men tend to value
autonomy, abstract reasoning, individual rights, hierarchical organization, and detachment
from others, [feminists] said, whereas women are more likely to value relationships, con-
textual reasoning, interdependence, and connection and responsibility to others." Kin-
ports, supra note 248, at 417. See generally Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law,
supra note 248.
254 As an example, see generally Mahoney, supra note 248.
255
 "Feminists have long realized that the absence of the state, of law, froin the private
sphere has itself contributed to male dominance and female subordination.... The bat-
tered women's movement has been, in the past twenty years, enormously successful in
bringing the 'private' problem of wife abuse to public attention." Seymore, supra note 242,
at 1071.
256 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 19, at 591 (discussing whether Rule 413 spreads or dimin-
ishes rape myths, and concluding that it perpetuates a stereotype of the chronic rapist);
Marilyn MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of Evidence, 25 U.B.C. L.
REv. 36, 49-50 (1991); Mahoney, supra note 248, at 6-7 (noting interaction of law and
culture and advocating "separation assault" as a legal concept that can "reshape cultural
understanding"); Orenstein, supra note 19, at 692 (opposing Rule 413, in part because it
perpetuates misconception that rape is not pervasive); Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer
Evidence Law, supra note 248, at 180.
287 See Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, supra note 248, at 213-17.
258 See WILLIAM TWINING, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RETHINKING
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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tion militates against having fixed rules, and in favor of discretionary
decision making. But if decisionmakers have attitudes tainted by sex-
ism, then fixed rules are needed to protect women, because discre-
tion will be exercised against them. Hence it is helpful to have as rigid
a rule as possible against admission of the complainant's sexual his-
tory in rape cases.
Moreover, evidence law is adjective, and it is hard to predict what
substantive effect a particular evidence proposal will have. For exam-
ple, an approach toward tough screening of "junk science" supported
by large manufacturers seeking to escape liability in products liability
cases can have the unexpected effect of hurting the prosecution in
criminal cases. Similarly, liberal admission of rape trauma syndrome
testimony can backfire when defendants in rape cases want to put in
evidence of absence of symptoms to support the conclusion that the
complainant was not raped. Thus, it may be harder for a substantive
agenda, such as that of liberal feminism or dominance feminism, to
be reflected in evidence law because one can see ahead of time that it
might cut both ways.
Perhaps for that reason, the areas in which reforms advocated by
feminists, and by others concerned with fair treatment of women,
seem to have been most effective and widely accepted are those in
which the beneficial impact of the reform in helping women is pre-
dictable because women are disproportionately the victims of a par-
ticular crime. These include "rape shield" statutes protecting sexual
assault victims from revelation of sexual history and exceptions to the
character evidence rule for prior crimes committed by the accused in
sex crime and domestic violence cases. 259
Much of the feminist writing on evidence is consistent with all
three of the above-described strands of feminism, including liberal
feminism, and hence its method is not too different from what might
be obtained by a conventional legal analyst concerned with fair treat-
ment of women. But sometimes dominance feminism or cultural
feminism seems to have led in directions that a conventional legal
analyst might not follow. Without attempting a comprehensive review
of the literature, we refer to four leading articles in which dominance
feminism or cultural feminism appears to have been particularly in-
fluential on the analysis or result. 260
259
 See generally Baker, supra note 19; Orenstein, supra note 19.
280
 Baker, supra note 19; Mahoney, supra note 248; Orenstein, supra note 19; Schep-
pele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note 247.
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Our first examples are two articles about Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 413, which allows evidence that the accused committed other
sexual assaults to be admitted in a sexual assault prosecution. 261 Aviva
Orenstein and Katharine Baker, working independently, both came to
the conclusion that the legislation was unwise and unjustifiable. 262
Strains of cultural feminism and dominance feminism can be seen in
both works. The authors see the legislation as unwise because it de-
contextualizes the situation by stereotyping rapists, treating them as
pathological outlaws rather than normal men engaged in situational
conduct. 265 The authors also believe the legislation perpetuates rape
"myths" about rape being strange and deviant, whereas the authors
see rape as common and widespread, and as a way that society con-
trols women. 2" Finally, because rape is so common, men who have
raped do not particularly stand out from other men, and hence rape
has less probative force than would be the case were it a rare phe-
nomenon. 265
Another example of scholarship that seems influenced by strands
of cultural feminism is Martha Mahoney's article about spousal abuse
cases. 266 She addresses the question of why women do not leave abu-
sive relationships. Much of her article consists of narratives, including
her own, of battered women. 267 She avoids criticism of Lenore Walker's
controversial work, 268 even though she has mixed feelings about the
281
 FED. R. EVID. 413.
282 Baker, supra note 19, at 623-24; Orenstein, supra note 19, at 690-97. The rape sta-
tistics are controversial. See NEIL GILBERT, Miscounting Social Ms: Sexual Assault and Advocacy
Research, in WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING SOCIAL EQUALITY 84,99-108 (1995); Park, supra
note 62, at 765-69.
282 Baker, supra note 19, at 576-83; Orenstein, supra note 19, at 690-97.
284 Baker, supra note 19, at 576-78; Orenstein, supra note 19, at 692-93.
265 Baker, supra note 19, at 578-83; Orenstein, supra note 19, at 693.
266
 Mahoney, supra note 248.
287 Id. at 7-8. She states:
[T]his article offers narratives and poems from the lives of survivors of do-
mestic violence, and a few from the stories of non-survivors, as part of its
analysis and argument_ Seven women's stories have come to me through their
own accounts. Five of these have at some time identified themselves as bat-
tered women.... The other women's voices in this paper are drawn from
identified published sources.
One of these stories is my own.
Id. {citations omitted).
558 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, Supra note 244. On Walker's method-
ology, see David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619,641-47 (1986).
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message sent by learned helplessness, 26
 and advocates using the con-
cept of "separation assault" as being more central to understanding
why the battered woman, who is likely to be assaulted upon separat-
ing, does not leave the abusive relationship. 270
Reliance on narratives is sometimes said to be a characteristic of
feminist writing, and Mahoney's article is a good example of extensive
use of narratives. She uses stories from acquaintances, from the facts
of reported cases, and from other published sources as social fact evi-
dence to support her views of domestic violence. 27 ' While she does
not reject quantitative social science, she seems to have an attitude
toward proof of social facts that differs from that of many social scien-
tists and Daubert-era evidence experts. She is indifferent to defects in
the methodology of Walker's battered woman research, assessing the
theory primarily in terms of its utility in telling a story of oppression
and the countervailing danger that the story may degrade women. 272
She uses anecdotal evidence extensively, and regards it as a source of
convincing proof instead of a source of hypotheses to be tested. 273
Stories from the author's acquaintances and from reported cases
would be viewed with suspicion by many social scientists because of
the small sample size and obvious problems of selection bias. (For one
262
 Mahoney, supra note 248, at 42. She states:
I do not mean to criticize here the psychological theory underlying battered
woman syndrome, or even the particular theory of learned helplessness. First,
the collection of experience and perception summed up in battered woman
syndrome are descriptively true of many women. Lenore Walker's defense of
expert testimony is also correct: it helps women's stories be brought into
court by bringing together fragments that women experience as part of a
whole relationship. Finally, I would not choose to discard such a major tool in
the effort to explain women's experience in court, just because it has proved
vulnerable to distortion in culture and law—we need more, not less, explana-
tion. However, as long as explanation emphasizes "helplessness" in the psy-
chology of individual women, it runs into the danger of contributing to
stereotyping.
Id. (citations omitted).
2" Id. at 7. She states:
Because of the interactive relationships between law and culture in this area,
law reform requires such an approach to simultaneously reshape cultural un-
derstanding. Separation assault is particularly easy to grasp because it re-
sponds to prevailing cultural and legal inquiry ("why didn't she leave") with a
twist emphasizing the batterer's violent quest for control.
Id.
271 Id. at 7-8.
272 See id. at 29-30.
273 Id. at 20-24.
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thing, the typicality of facts stated in reported cases is highly suspect
because trial of a question of fact is itself an aberration; the typical
dispute never reaches the legal system, and those that do rarely sur-
vive to trial and appeal.) Narratives and counter-narratives can be
produced on almost any issue. It is not clear that feminists rely on an-
ecdotal evidence more than the conventional fireside policy analyst,
which includes most lawyers, though feminist writers seem more ready
to reveal their reliance on it and even revel in it. In some cases, this
may be due to suspicion of the motives and funding sources of social
scientists, 274 or simply to belief in the power of general feminist the-
ory to guide the way in deciding which narratives to believe.
The final example is an article by Kim Lane Scheppele entitled
Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revi-
sion of Truth. 275 This article, using the Anita Hill hearings as its point
of departure, posits that impeachment of witnesses hurts women dis-
proportionately because women delay in making a complaint or give
inconsistent versions of a complaint at different times. 276 In cases of
sexualized violence, such as rape, sexual harassment, or spousal
abuse, victims often delay in reporting the incident and do not report
a full or accurate version the first time. 277 They then suffer when im-
peached with evidence of delay in reporting or of prior inconsistent
statements. But victims have legitimate reasons for delay and revision.
They are traumatized by the attack. Or they fear that the dominant
culture might blame the victim, for example, by saying that she pro-
voked the attack. 278 Or they do not perceive the full implications of,
say, sexual harassment until after they have thought about it or per-
haps had therapy. Instead, they may present initial accounts that try to
repair relationships and make things normal again. 276
In addition to her points that are specific to women and sexual-
ized violence, Scheppele has a more general point rooted in post-
modern epistemology. Invoking Wittgenstein, she notes that accounts
of events ("stories") are narratives that are influenced by interpretive
274 Mahoney, supra note 248, at 27-28 (noting "split between social scientists and femi-
nist activists on domestic violence issues"; complaining about "gender-neutral approach" of
some social scientists; arguing that funding sources have affected how issues were explored
and what research was done, and that "conscious use of feminist methodology in research
is rare").
275 Scheppele, Just the Fads, Ma'am, supra note 247.
276 Id. at 126-28.
277 Id. at 13g-39.
276 Id. at 142-43.
276 Id. at 138-41,
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frarneworks. 28° A woman who interprets her husband's violence to-
ward her as expressing his love does not see an event of battering the
same way that a feminist lawyer sees it. 281
 But the difference in ac-
counts that the feminist lawyer and the battered woman would give is
not, Scheppele writes, a difference "between truth and falsehood,"
but a difference in interpretive frameworks. 282
 Consciousness raising
may cause the same person to see the same event in different ways. 283
The second interpretation may be better, just as a revised paper is bet-
ter than the original. Understanding how accounts of facts are "so-
cially constituted" is necessary to liberate women from sexualized vio-
lence: "[F]act-finders need to understand that early narratives about
sexualized violence may reveal not some deeper truth, but rather the
effects of oppression on women. Not allowing women to reinterpret
their own experiences as they learn to oppose the abuse is a way of
furthering that oppression."284
Scheppele's solution for this perceived unfairness is not entirely
clear. In her first article on the subject she complained about judicial
"exclusion "
 of revised accounts, which would be manifestly unfair
treatment if "exclusion" meant exclusion from evidence. 285 The re-
vised accounts are not excluded from evidence, of course, but merely
subject to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. 286 Although
an operational solution is not offered in any detail, Scheppele's gen-
eral message is clear—that "much more sympathy and belief" should
be given the revised stories, even when they contradict what was said
28° Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note 247, at 167-68.
la' Id. at 168.
282 Id.
288 Id. at 168-70.
281
 Id. at 172.
288
 "Courts' exclusion of revised stories works disproportionately against women be-
cause women are disproportionately the victims of a socialization that masks the immedi-
ate recognition of sexualized abuse as abuse." Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note
247, at 169-70.
280
 Scheppele recognizes this point in a later article on the same subject, in which she
says:
What I have argued so far is that the Federal Rules of Evidence show a strong
preference for acquiring information as close in time and space to the events
in issue as possible. This does not mean that all other information is ex-
cluded. Certainly not It means, however, that whatever is said and done at the
time of the trouble will always have a place in the evidence that must be con-
sidered.
Scheppele, Ground-Zero, supra note 247, at 330.
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at the time of the events that led to the litigation. 287 And even though
she relies on examples from cases involving sexual violence and har-
assment, she seems to call for application of her perspective to all
kinds of cases.
The importance of freshness of memory is a psychological insight
that is not often questioned, and Scheppele is effective in making us
think twice about it. Nevertheless, she could have done more to com-
bine feminist social science with other studies of perception and
memory. In her principal article, Scheppele virtually ignores the ex-
tensive body of literature on eyewitness testimony, except for one un-
explained citation to Elizabeth Loftus. 288 Some of the psychology
scholarship on eyewitnesses would be helpful to her argument—stud-
ies suggesting, for example, that consistency in description of suspects
is not a strong predictor of accuracy. 289 Other parts of this body of
scholarship would not strengthen Scheppele's argument—studies of
the contaminating effect of post-event information and suggestive in-
terviewing are examples. 280
In summary, feminist evidence scholarship sometimes reflects an
attitude that favors qualitative anecdotal data (such as narratives) over
systematic quantitative analysis, that views science as irredeemably po-
litical, or that at least views general feminist theory as a better guide
to social facts than the sorts of expertise and data generally favored by
scientists and by Daubert. For example, Professor Taslitz opposes using
a "flat exclusionary rule" for evidence that "helps to convey an ex-
cluded group's voice," even if the evidence fails more conventional
criteria such as whether the methodology that produces the evidence
is valid by the conventions of science. 291 This attitude may explain why
discussions of battered woman's syndrome sometimes seem result-
oriented, as if the portrait that the theory paints of women is more
287 Id. at 334.
2B8 Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note 247, at 167 n.174.
289 Ste CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 40, at 93-95.
290 In her more recent article, Scheppele seems more receptive to the idea that reflec-
tion can contaminate memories, and is somewhat broader in her citation of social science
literature. In Scheppele, Ground-Zero, supra note 247, at 325-26, she notes psychological
experiments on the distortion of memory, writing that "subjects in experiments often show
that their memories can in fact be predictably altered by the introduction of new informa-
tion, and they unproblematically (even unconsciously) take into account the new informa-
tion as if it were part of the original memory." This, of course, is a very good reason to
distrust factual accounts given after there has been some time for reflection, for time af-
fords possibilities for distortion even if one assumes that reflection itself does not distort.
291 Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, supra note 248, at 211.
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important in judging its acceptability than the validity of the research
methods that produced it.
Of course, much legal thinking and law rely on anecdotes and
fireside inductions. In that, feminist scholarship is entirely main-
stream. Moreover, many (and probably most) of the hypotheses de-
veloped by feminist scholars are amenable to empirical testing. Femi-
nist scholarship generates ideas that are unlikely to have been thought
of without the theoretical discipline that gave rise to them. The em-
pirical soundness of many of those new hypotheses deserves to be
studied and tested. Much the same can be said for evidence law and
economics scholarship, to which we turn next.
VI. ECONOMICS AND EVIDENCE
Until quite recently, it could be said that law and economics
scholars had virtually nothing to say about evidence law. 292 This is not
exactly surprising. Evidence scholarship focuses on understanding,
explaining, evaluating, and suggesting improvements for rules that
are concerned principally with the goal of maximizing the ability of
trials to discover the truth of a matter in dispute. 2g5 It is easy to see
how various fields might contribute to this endeavor, such as logic,
291 See Park, supra note 8, at 849 n.2. Some might say that Jeremy Bentham was an ex-
ception. But Bentham was a long time ago; his Rationale of Judicial Evidence was published
in 1827. BENTHAM, supra note 3. He was less an economist than a utilitarian philosopher
(and cognitivist). His solution to any problem of evidence was to abolish rules and rely on
the discretion of judge and jury. And his work has been all but ignored by evidence schol-
ars of the twentieth century. See TWINING, supra note 3, at ix.
293 See, e.g., William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 Mon. L. REV. 261, 272
(1984). Twining states;
The most striking feature of [evidence scholarship] is how homogeneous it is.
Nearly all of the Anglo-American writers from Gilbert to Cross have shared es-
sentially the same basic assumptions about the nature and ends of adjudica-
tion and about what is involved in proving facts in this context.... It can be
re-stated simply in some such terms as these: the primary end of adjudication
is rectitude of decision, that is the correct application of rules of substantive
law to facts that have been proved to an agreed standard of truth or probabil-
ity. The pursuit of truth in adjudication must at times give way to other values
and purposes, such as the preservation of state security or of family
confidences; disagreements may arise as to what priority to give to rectitude
of decision as a social value and to the nature and scope of certain competing
values.... But the end of the enterprise is clear: the establishment of truth.
Id. See other citations and quotations to similar effect in Chris William Sanchirico, Charac-
ter Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 CoLum. L. REV, 1227 passim (2001).
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psychology and other cognitive sciences, philosophy, statistics, femi-
nism, and so on. But economics?
The first great law and economics movement, which arose in the
late nineteenth century, involved the macroeconomics of law. 294
 It was
concerned with political economy, the behavior of markets, and eco-
nomic systems, and was reflected in areas of law such as anti-trust,
taxation, and banking regulation. The second great law and econom-
ics movement—the one with which readers of this article will be more •
familiar—involves the microeconomics of law, the pursuit of efficiency
and wealth maximization. 296 It has been concerned with the effects on
individual behavior of varying incentive structures and has been re-
flected in economic analyses of torts, contracts, property, and criminal
law. What could marginalism or wealth maximization have to do with
the truth-seeking goals of evidence law?
Only recently has there been a broad-gauged attempt to apply
microeconomics to evidence law. To be sure, there were occasional
articles on incentives and disincentives for gathering evidence, 296 how
those incentives affect the evidence offered to courts, 297 the resulting
outcomes of trials and the impact of those outcomes on behavior (es-
pecially economic activity) outside of court. 298 These studies focused
mainly on the problems of assembling evidence for trials and the ef-
fects of verdicts. Recently, we have seen broader attempts to apply
economics to evidence law and the philosophy of evidence. We focus
here on three authors whose work illustrates this new contribution to
evidence scholarship.
Perhaps fittingly, the first broad major law and economics treat-
ment of evidence law, tackling a wide range of evidence topics, is by
Richard Posner.2 In his article, Judge Posner's assumptions about
rational planning often lead him to inferences about evidence rules'
strong ex ante effects. His perspective entails implicit assumptions
about pervasive knowledge of the rules among the general popula-
tion, and about the friction-free willingness of actors to change cus-
494 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV.
993, 994-95 (1990).
295 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003).
298 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial
Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 (2000).
291 Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert 's Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific Evi-
dence and the Adversarial System, 4 SUPREME CT. EcoN. REV. 1 (1995).
498 David Grump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors Be Given
to Determine the Amount of a Punitive-Damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174 (1998).
499 Posner, supra note 179.
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tomary ways of doing things in order to obtain an advantage if they
ever wind up in litigation, assumptions which sometimes seem unreal-
istic." As might be expected, Judge Posner also brings to his study of
evidence law a sensitivity to costs, trade-offs, and substitutions. 301
Posner's rational choice, ex ante perspective is not the best start-
ing point when drawing inferences about the issues at the core of tra-
ditional American evidence law. Many rules, such as the hearsay and
character evidence bans, have long been viewed as being tailored with
cognitive biases in mind and aiming to control reasoning at trial
rather than future primary conduct." They seek to protect against
mistaken, unreasonable, or lawless interpretations of evidence by fac-
tfinders. But Posner is fearless in applying his perspective, even to
seemingly unpromising topics such as character evidence." We de-
scribe and discuss some of those ideas. First, we present some of the
good ones.
In his discussion of search and seizure, Posner assesses the value
of sanctions other than exclusion of evidence, such as damages reme-
dies for illegal searches." Posner argues that if these alternative sanc-
tions were effective, there would be evidentiary gain because the
searches would not be made in the first place." Therefore, he sug-
gests, those who oppose Mapp v. Ohio" ought to be arguing about
the definition of illegal search rather than about the sanction. 3°7
Scholars from the law and economics perspective seem able to come
up with that sort of realization much more readily than others.
Next, there is the famous blue bus conundrum." Suppose a
plaintiff is negligently injured by a bus, but cannot determine what
bus company owned the bus that hurt him. And suppose it can be
learned that bus Company A runs 51 buses along the route where the
accident occurred, while Company B runs 49 buses there. Should the
3°0 See id. at 1529,1531.
"1 Id, at 1542-46.
505 But see the discussion of Sanchirico's work, infra notes 320-332 and accompanying
text.
5" For more thorough critiques of Posner's article, see Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at
1510-27; Lempert, supra note 2, at 1639-700. See generally Park, supra note 2.
5" Posner, supra note 179, at 1533.
"5 Id.
3" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5" Posner, supra note 179, at 1533.
50
 For commentary on the blue bus problem, see generally Allen, supra note 179;
Callen, supra note 179; Shaviro, A Response to Professor Allen, supra note 179; Shaviro, A Re-
sponse to Professor Gallen, supra note 179; Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Ap-
pearance offustice, supra note 179.
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"naked" statistical fact that the defendant Company A owns 51% of
the buses be admissible and sufficient to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that one of the defendant's buses caused the plain-
tiff's injuries? Here is part of Posner's analysis of this problem:
Suppose both parties do conduct a thorough investigation
yet are unable to come up with any additional evidence bear-
ing on the ownership of the bus. There is no longer a basis
for suspicion that the plaintiff really believes that a bus
owned by Company B hit him, or for punishing him for not
having investigated more. The case may seem no different
from any other one tried under the preponderance of the
evidence standard in which the balance of probabilities tilts
only slightly in favor of the plaintiff. But there is a differ-
ence. Suppose the legal system can identify an entire class of
cases in which the balance of probabilities tilts as slightly in
favor of the plaintiff as it does in the bus case. If there are
1000 such cases, then allowing them to be tried can be ex-
pected to yield 510 correct decisions (that is, 510 decisions
in which the defendant was in fact the injurer) and 490 in-
correct ones, while not allowing them to be tried can be ex-
pected to yield 490 correct decisions and 510 erroneous
ones. The social benefits of the twenty additional correct de-
cisions that allowing the 1000 cases to be tried would pro-
duce—benefits in more perfect deterrence of negligent ac-
cidents—would probably fall short of the social cost of 1000
trials. 5®
Posner's analysis makes the useful policy point that admitting the evi-
dence, and therefore allowing the trials to go forward, has the virtue
of reaching more correct results, but there is a disproportionate social
cost of that marginal improvement in accuracy. 31°
Now we turn to some bad ideas. Posner argues that if the bus case
were allowed to go to the jury, bus Company A would have a big in-
centive to be careful and bus Company B would have little or no in-
centive. Over time, B would cause more accidents, though with fewer
" Posner, supra note 179, at 1510.
510 On the other hand, if the analysis is correct, it would seem that the decision whether
to allow the evidence would turn on what proportion of the blue bus company's buses run on
that route. At some point, the gain in accuracy becomes worth the administrative and trans.
action costs. So it would seem that a rule setting a higher threshold for admission of such
evidence would be the efficient solution in such cases.
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busses, because it would be less careful; moreover, a monopoly would
eventually be created because A, burdened by higher liability costs,
would withdraw from the route. 51 '
Judge Posner seems to enjoy revving up his models and seeing
where they go, and it is not clear that he is completely serious in his
remark about the demise of bus Company A. 312
 At any rate, the con-
sequence predicted is speculative and fails to take account of likely
changes in behavior. If the companies really reacted that strongly to
the burden of having liability imposed on the basis of naked statistical
evidence, then they might instead each reduce the number of busses
in an attempt to have fewer than half, thus leading to a race to the
bottom. 313
 But it seems more likely either that naked statistical cases
would be so rare as not to affect conduct at all, or that if the compa-
nies did feel pressure to reduce the number of busses, there would be
countervailing incentives that lead to adjustments in conduct, such as
use of safety measures, that would make it worthwhile for the domi-
nant company to bear the litigation burden while continuing to oper-
ate. Consumers might even prefer the larger and safer company, pay-
ing a premium for its services. Only one thing is clear: the ex ante
consequences of the rule, if they exist at all, are highly speculative and
unpredictable.
Next, we look at questionable economic ideas about character
evidence. Posner argues the following regarding prior-crime evidence:
It is only weakly probative, because repeat offenders are pun-
ished more heavily than first-time offenders in part precisely
to offset any greater propensity to commit crimes that their
previous convictions have revealed. If recidivists are pun-
ished severely enough, the propensity to commit a subse-
311
 Posner, supra note 179, at 1510.
312
 The bus-monopoly comment occurs at one of two places in which Judge Posner
puts an exclamation point after a speculative comment about ex ante effects. See Posner,
supra note 179, at 1510 (Posner's present comment that allowing naked statistical evidence
to sustain "blue bus" verdict might lead to bus monopoly); id. at 1532 (comment that ab-
rogating attorney-client privilege might increase enrollment in law schools, because clients
would seek to learn more about the law themselves). Professor Lempert has decoded this
punctuation to mean that Judge Posner was joking. See Lempert, supra note 2, at 1671,
1690. If so, this is an unusual way to signal humor, and one is left puzzled about how to
treat other passages that lacked exclamation points but also seemed far-fetched.
313 Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1526.
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quent offense may be reduced to the same level as the pro-
pensity to commit a first offense."
This proposition—that previously convicted defendants, if pun-
ished severely enough, will not be any more likely to commit crime
than persons with clean records—would seem to merit a look at the
empirical evidence. It requires justification in view of data showing
that previously convicted defendants are dozens or hundreds of times
more likely to commit an offense than are persons chosen at ran-
dom." Just proposing new ideas based upon a rational choice model,
under which potential offenders apparently make a reasonable as-
sessment of the value of present gratification compared to future pun-
ishment, 316 can be positively misleading to policymakers unless the
scholar is willing to check his assumptions against potentially dis-
confirming data. 517
Marital privilege is another area where Posner's analysis some-
times gets out of control, requiring more human foresight, knowl-
edge, and flexibility than is plausible. It is doubtful that even law pro-
fessors consult the rules about marital privilege before confiding in
their spouses or committing a crime, but Posner has ordinary people
doing both."
We agree with Allen and Leiter that Judge Posner's article is
prone to speculative theorizing." We cannot say for certain that
314 Posner, supra note 179, at 1525.
313 See Park, supra note 62, at 758-63. Prediction systems using actuarial methods
commonly use prior crimes as a predictor. See MICHAEL R. GorrFaEosoN & TRAVIS
HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME, passim and 107 (1990) (stating that "research
regularly shows that the best predictor of crime is prior criminal behavior" and that the
differences between people, with respect to the likelihood they will commit criminal acts,
persist over time); JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEFT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71-72 (1981) ("If there is one finding that overshadows
all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases with
each prior criminal act."). See generally PETER HOFFMAN, PREDICTING CRIMINALITY, U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE STUDY GUIDE (1988); VERNON L. QUINSEY, GRANT T. HARRIS, MARNIE E.
RICE & CATHERINE A. CORMIER, VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
(1998).
315 It seems likely, for example, that persons who are prone to criminal acts are also
prone to an unrealistically low estimate of the danger of getting caught and the cost of
future punishment. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 315, passim and 107.
317 Park, supra note 2, at 2057-58.
3113 Posner, supra note 179, at 1530-31.
315 Allen & Leiter, supra note 2, at 1521-27. However, for a similar economic analysis in
a case that reaches a much more plausible legal conclusion, see Judge Posner's opinion in
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589,593 (7th Cir. 1986) (opining
that decision rules in preliminary motions should minimize the cost of error).
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these are incorrect, flawed ideas. We can say that, if the reality of hu-
man behavior is important to evidence policy, and hypotheses are to
be tested, then one has to have some idea about which hypotheses are
plausible enough to be worth the effort. One could regard the pas-
sages discussed above as saying: "I'm not asserting this is true; I'm just
showing you where the model leads; I'm just throwing out ideas for
you ordinary scholars to check out." But in deciding whether to seek
empirical verification of ideas, one has to make some choices about
what to test. Guidance could come from theory, analogous studies,
fireside inductions from history and experience, and intuition. With
those preliminary screening tools as our guide, many of Posner's eco-
nomic ideas about evidence law appear unpromising.
In contrast to Posner's shotgun approach to applying economic
ideas to evidence law, the scholars whose work we examine next use a
laser.
The first work reflects the characteristic concern of contempo-
rary law and economics with the impact of incentives and disincen-
tives on individual behavior by deliberately looking away from the
fact-finding function of evidence rules to consider the arguable im-
pact of the rules on (mostly) crime deterrence.s 2° More specifically,
Professor Sanchirico argues that the rule prohibiting the use of char-
acter evidence for propensity reasons cannot be explained coherently
or convincingly in terms of enhancing the accuracy of trial fact find-
ing.s21
 He reviews each of the major extant truth-focused explanations
for the rule—namely, the limited probative value of character evi-
dence, the strong tendency of the jury to overweigh such evidence,
the temptation of the jury to impose liability for the defendant's
character rather than for the wrongful conduct charged, judicial
efficiency, an effort to impel parties to produce more and better evi-
dence directed toward the conduct at issue, and trial bias (a biased
distribution of persons selected for prosecution that further reduces
the inferential value of character evidence)—and argues that they are
unconvincing. 3"
320
 See generally Sanchirico, supra note 293.
321 Id. at 1231-32.
322 Id. at 1239-59. We need not delay with a critique of his critiques, except to say that
the traditional explanations do not strike us to be as weak as Sanchirico asserts. Sanchirico,
like most if not all of us, holds rival theories to higher standards of validity than he holds
his own. Interested readers will have to decide for themselves whether Sanchirico has
reached the right verdict on each theory, including his own.
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Sanchirico then offers a new explanation for the rule, one rooted
in the notion that trials in general, and this rule in particular, are de-
vices for dispensing primary incentives. To explain the rule coher-
ently, all we need do is analyze the character evidence ban in light of
its ability to deter undesirable conduct, rather than its ability to lead
factfinders closer to truth:
Character evidence ... is one area in which the truth seek-
ing approach and the primary incentives approach to trial
point in very different directions. This Article makes use of
that divergence to advance our understanding of both char-
acter evidence and trial. It demonstrates that many of the
rules governing character evidence—so difficult to rational-
ize when trial is regarded as an isolated exercise in sorting
out past events—fall easily into place when trial is viewed as
but one component of the larger system by which the state
regulates everyday out of court behavior. The Article draws
from this stark disparity in explanatory power the important
lesson that, despite most of what is said about the object of
trial, our desire to find the truth is subordinate to our desire,
in effect, to shape it through the provision of incentives." 3
The essential argument of Sanchirico's theory about the charac-
ter evidence ban is this: character evidence has predictive and there-
fore probative value. 324 But it has no incentive value—its presence or
absence creates no incentive to refrain from proscribed acts. 325 "Trace
evidence,"326 on the other hand, generally comes into being by the
commission of proscribed acts and generally does not when such acts
are not performed. Thus, trace evidence has incentive value. 327 By
focusing on trace evidence, the law reinforces the disincentive to com-
mitting proscribed acts. Were character evidence permitted as evi-
dence of conduct, the disincentive for performing proscribed acts
would be dampened. 328 Without a character evidence ban, a person
with a "bad" character is in a "damned if you do and damned if you
523 Id. at 1231-32.
324 No one disagrees with this proposition. Even those who regard character evidence
as a weak predictor of behavior do not say that it has zero predictive value.
325 Id, at 1260-63.
526 Evidence left by the commission of an act, including the memories of eyewitnesses.
327 Sanchirico, supra note 293, at 1262.
323 Id. at 1266.
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don't" situation. 329
 If he refrains from the proscribed behavior, he still
could be convicted of a relevant crime based on the evidence that he
is more likely than others to commit such crimes. But with a character
evidence ban in place, refraining from proscribed acts has greater
power to prevent conviction (because the trace evidence necessary for
conviction will not exist) and therefore the person is more likely to
refrain. Thus, deterrence is stronger with the rule against character
evidence than without it. 330
The posited effect is plausible, but not intuitively compelling. It is
possible, for example, that admission of character evidence would
have the opposite effect. Persons tainted by provable prior offenses
would realize that their chance of conviction would be high if they
were arrested, and make a special effort to avoid situations that might
lead to arrest. Sexual predators would not share beds with children;
assaultive personalities would avoid dangerous barrooms. That effect
could cause prior offenders to avoid situations and associations that
might tempt them to crime, thus deterring it. To our intuitions, it
seems unlikely that the rule prohibiting use of character evidence
against the accused (but allowing use of bad acts for other purposes)
has any substantial effect on the conduct of potential violators. In the
exceptional situations where potential perpetrators do take the rule
into account, the question whether it deters or promotes crime is
highly uncertain and speculative.
Even though our intuitions differ from his, Sanchirico's theory is
plausible in accounting for the existing law. What is less plausible is
that judges, facing an issue of whether evidence should be admitted at
trial, presented with arguments from counsel about accuracy versus
fairness, and despite writing opinions that consider the problem in
those terms, are nevertheless solving the dilemma with entirely differ-
ent goals in mind, and that the most influential (if not most) judges
are collectively engaged in the unexpressed enterprise of talking
about in
-court accuracy versus fairness but adopting rules calculated
for out-of-court deterrence. It's not impossible, but surely improbable.
Sanchirico uses this basic incentivist notion to explain the wis-
dom of an array of related rules: the admissibility of character evi-
dence for impeachment, at sentencing, and for punitive damages; ex-
ceptions to the character evidence rule that make sense from a
329 Id.
"° Id.
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deterrence perspective; and exceptions to the character evidence rule
that do not make sense from a deterrence perspective."'
The article illustrates an important value of the "new" discipline's
meta-theoretical imperatives. Because it is the concern of microeco-
nomic analysis to search for incentives and consider their effects, San-
chirico was led to look away from the trial's apparent internal quest
for true facts and look instead to the effects of the rule outside of the
trial. He was led to look away from seeing the rule as part of a back-
ward-looking search for truth to seeing it instead as a forward-looking
tool of social control.
If Sanchirico were arguing that evidence rules are primarily
aimed at truth seeking or fair fighting in trials, but that they inevitably
have evidence-generating or evidence-suppressing effeCts in the world
outside of trials, his argument would be both hard to disagree with
and less interesting. We refer to situations where potential defendants
in sexual harassment suits act to ensure that their conduct with poten-
tial accusers takes place in the presence of witnesses; document reten-
tion (and destruction) policies at corporations; and careful manage-
ment of hazardous waste in anticipation of the burdens of proof in
environmental lawsuits. Or, if he argued that specific rules evolved to
provide incentives for certain relationships (notably, the privilege
rules, which promote candid communication among clients and pa-
tients and spouses) and behavior (notably, the exclusion of evidence
of repairs following accidents so that lawsuits do not become disincen-
tives to accident prevention), he would, again, be making an argu-
ment that would be both hard to disagree with and nothing new. But
Sanchirico goes much further.
Although Sanchirico focuses on one rule, he argues that his
analysis is illustrative of a larger truth about trials: they are more con-
cerned with "influencing what happens in the future... than discov-
ering what happened in the past."" 2 That is a bold departure from
(and challenge to) the heretofore nearly unanimous evidence schol-
arship of the past several hundred years. Whether it can be shown to
be true remains to be seen. But who cannot be excited by the debates
promised by so grand a claim, however those debates might turn out?
331 The most prominent example is the relatively recent exception admitting evidence
of an accused's propensity to engage in proscribed sexual conduct. FED. R. EVID. 412. Ac-
cording to Sanchirico's economic analysis, these rules will reduce the disincentive to
commit such crimes. Id. at 1301.
332 Sanchirico, supra note 293, at 1259.
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While much of Posner's analysis and the central core of San-
chirico's work look at evidence law less as a set of rules designed to
improve truth finding and more as devices concerned with regulating
behavior outside of trial by dispensing contingent incentives and dis-
incentives, Alex Stein and his colleagues bring economic analysis back
to evidence scholarship's traditional concern with the effect of the
rules on decision making.
In a recent article, Stein succeeds in combining traditional evi-
dence scholarship's core concern of accurate factfinding with a "con-
sequentialist game-theoretic perspective." 333
 Professors Seidmann and
Stein explore the question of whether the right of criminal defen-
dants to remain silent benefits only guilty defendants or whether it
creates conditions that assist factfinders in distinguishing innocent
from guilty defendants, and therefore benefits courts and society (by
reducing the incidence of erroneous convictions). Critics of the right
to silence dating back at least to Bentham"' have argued that inno-
cent suspects and defendants do not need the right (they desire to
offer true exculpatory evidence), and that only the guilty will avail
themselves of it, thus increasing the incidence of erroneous acquit-
tals. 3" Defenders of the right to silence have defended it on a com-
pletely different plane, arguing that regardless of any costs in accuracy
it may entail, the right is necessary to promote moral and ethical val-
ues of fair process. 3"
Seidmann , and Stein offer an economic argument supporting the
right to silence that had been overlooked by both utilitarian critics
and libertarian defenders. The critics of the right to silence made a
series of economic miscalculations; 3" the defenders may have turned
to moral and ethical arguments because the erroneous reasoning of
the critics appeared so persuasive. In any event, consequentialist game
theory analysis has led to a new and utilitarian explanation for and
defense of the right to silence.
To summarize: If they were compelled to submit to interroga-
tions and to testify, guilty suspects and defendants would tell lies to
333
 Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. R.F.v. 430,431 (2000).
534 In fairness to Bentham, his views were at least sometimes compatible with the best
evidence principle in regard to rules excluding evidence. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evi-
dence Principle, 79 lowA L. REV. 227,274-75 (1988).
555 Seidmann & Stein, supra note 333, at 451-52.
536 Id. at 452-55.
3'37 M. at 455-58.
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avoid conviction. Whenever police or prosecutors are unable to ex-
pose those lies, the guilty would be indistinguishable from the inno-
cent. Jurors and judges, aware that guilty (as well as innocent) defen-
dants were offering exculpatory statements, would discount those
statements, giving all of them less weight. With the right to silence,
guilty suspects face the choice of telling lies that could be discovered
(adding to the evidence against them) or exercising their right to si-
lence. As more guilty defendants choose the option of remaining si-
lent, they do not "pool with" innocent suspects and defendants.""
Consequently, innocent and guilty suspects and defendants become
more distinguishable.mg Thus, the right to silence helps the innocent
to be found not guilty.
Further analysis suggests that these effects are most likely to occur
when the prosecution's evidence is moderately inculpatory (rather
than weak or strong), and works only when the standard of proof is
"beyond a reasonable doubt" (rather than some lower threshold). 340
Indeed, the authors argue that a reduction in the standard of proof
would lead not only to more erroneous convictions, "but also [to] seri-
ous indeterminacy in suspect identification and selection."341 The au-
thors argue that their analysis fits well with, and supports, or explains,
not only the basic Fifth Amendment right of silence, but much of the
jurisprudence that has grown up around it. 342
The game theory analysis consists largely of thinking through the
strategies of innocent and guilty suspects and defendants under vary-
ing conditions of evidence, standards of proof, and several other vari-
ables."' These are plausible, reasonable arguments about what sus-
pects and defendants and factfinders would do. But they rarely are
informed by empirical data about such behavior. They could be in-
3" Id. at 457.
333 Id.
34a Seidmann & Stein, supra note 333, at 470.
34 I Id. at 449.
342 For examples, see Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (applying the
right to silence in sentencing proceedings); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982)
(permitting adverse inferences from pre-arrest and post-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes if a defendant testifies); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980)
(same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding that the right to si-
lence protects only against compelled testimony, not against compelled production of
physical evidence); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (prohibiting adverse
inferences from refusal to testify).
343 Seidmann & Stein, supra note 333, at 466-74.
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correct.s" The absence of empirical testing is, of course, typical of
economic analysis of law.' 45
Seidmann and Stein do, however, offer a brief section that pur-
ports to test the implications of their theory against empirical data. 345
Though the section seems to be an afterthought, and not much intel-
lectual energy is put into it, at least it is there. But the data are tenu-
ous347
 and presented in a way that is confusing if not contradictory.
344
 For example, regarding the assumption that innocent suspects tell exonerating
truths: To what extent do innocent suspects lie also, in order to add a margin of safety to
their factual innocence, only to get caught in the lie? (Doesn't that vitiate anti-pooling
effects?) Regarding the assumption, id. at 450, that only in the "rare" case, with abnormal
people or abnormal circumstances, do the police so confuse or intimidate suspects that
they cannot make rational calculations about their own best moves: To what extent do
police interrogation techniques succeed in confusing or intimidating typical suspects into
making foolish choices, including making inculpatory statements (which, after all, is ex-
actly what interrogation methods are designed to do)? Regarding the assumption that "a
typical suspect confesses to a crime only when confronted with evidence that he believes to
be irrefutable," id. at 450-51, to what extent is this true? Will guilty suspects choose to
continue to remain silent even if inferences based on silence are allowed—for example,
because they have no convincing story, or because prior convictions will become admissi-
ble? lithe guilty did speak instead of confessing or remaining silent, would their tales be as
convincing as those of the innocent? See Cordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquit-
ting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 956-
60 (2002). Is it plausible to believe simultaneously that factfinders obey the instruction not
to draw adverse inferences from silence to an extent that encourages guilty defendants to
remain silent, and also that the right to silence favors the innocent by making factfinders
more likely to believe their stories? See id. at 942.
The answer the authors are likely to give is that so long as a plurality of the actual be-
havior is consistent with their assumptions, their theory still has predictive and explanatory
value.
But it is worth reminding ourselves about the value of data. One illustration of the
usefulness of combining data on actual behavior with game theory is provided by Professor
Robert Axelrod. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). Axelrod
conducted a game theory contest in which entrants submitted computer programs de-
signed to elicit cooperative responses from the opponent in the game. Naturally, many
entries were based on theories sans data. The winning entry, it turned out, was from a psy-
chologist who doubtless knew from empirical experiments on game theory by research
psychologists (for an example, see ___AvaTot, RAPOPORT, EXPERIMENTAL GAMES AND THEIR
Uses IN PSYCHOLOGY 19, 25-28 (1973)) that the most successful strategy for eliciting co-
operation from an opponent is tit for tat, and who wrote a simple program to play that
strategy. AXELROD, Supra, at 31.
343
 Posner has urged, in another context, that theoretical assumptions and hypotheses
be empirically and rigorously tested with data. Richard A. Posner, The Summary fury Trial
and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 366, 367 (1986).
34° Seidmann & Stein, supra note 333, at 498-502.
347
 Seidmann and Stein themselves declare half of the data to be useless—in their
words, "too contaminated with measurement error (including inconsistent classification
schemes) to draw any meaningful conclusions." Id. at 500.
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From the data mish-mash they conclude that the two predictions they
derive from their model are confirmed.s48
Perhaps the most telling finding (the import of which is not
noted by Seidmann and Stein) is that very few suspects refuse to an-
swer police questions. Siedmann and Stein cite two American studies
that found that only 9.5% and 20.9% of suspects invoked their right
to silence.MY British studies found about 10%, and a law allowing
prosecutors to argue adverse inferences reduced that number by only
a few percents° If the actual figure is around 10%, and the claimed
benefits are found only when the inculpatory evidence is moderate,
then we are talking about a few percent of cases. If the vast majority of
suspects talk even when they have a right to silence, then presumably
most of them are offering the police lies that falsely tend to exoner-
ate. Does this not create the very pooling that the article argues is
prevented by the right to silence? But if so many presumably guilty
suspects lie rather than avail themselves of their right to silence, then
Bentham and his followers are also rather far off the mark.ssl
348 Id. at 499, 502.
343 Id. at 448 n.60.
150 Id. at 501.
331 Which suggests to us that economists of the law have not escaped the need to be
more concerned about data. Economic models are not the royal road to truth, and need
to be tested more earnestly. In the paper's introduction, the authors dismissed the empiri-
cal approach:
A factual examination of these assumptions may follow two principal
routes. One of these routes is empirical. By gathering and analyzing relevant
empirical data, one can evaluate the workings of the right to silence without
relying on sheer intuition. Such an approach might determine, statistically or
by any other epistemologically plausible standard, whether the right aids only
the guilty. The alternative route, which this Article follows, is behavioral mod-
eling. Such modeling is usually, but not exclusively, based on rational-choice
theory. Because reliable empirical evidence is often unavailable, the empirical
approach is often problematic, as is the case with the factual assumptions ex-
amined by this Article. For example, it is extremely difficult, if not altogether
impossible, to estimate the effect of the right to silence on the rate of true
and false confessions. A suspect may confess to a crime for a variety of rea-
sons. He may confess to a crime truthfully on finding the incriminating evi-
dence irresistible. Alternatively, he may make a false or a truthful confession
under the pressure of police questioning. He may also make a false confes-
sion to exonerate the actual guilty party (for example, out of fear or love). A
suspect deciding to remain silent during his interrogation may do so regard-
less of the right to silence: silence would be the best strategy for many guilty
suspects even in the absence of a right.
An even greater problem inherent in the empirical approach lies in its
limited ability to produce determinate predictions when applied to human
actions and decisions. There is no good reason to believe that uniformly ob-
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Other analyses by Stein take the view that evidence law is less a
method of maximizing the chances of finding the truth in a disputed
matter than a means of appOrtioning the risk of error when decisions
are made under uncertainty. In his recent book, Foundations of Evi-
dence Law, Stein proposes a theory built on economic analysis com-
bined with probability theory, epistemology, and moral philosophy. 552
In Stein's analysis, evidence rules exist principally to ensure the just
allocation of errors, not to prevent errors by finding truth. 353
 By tak-
ing the view that evidence law seeks the just allocation of the risk of
error, Stein seeks to resolve a number of paradoxes that seem to result
from a purely truth-seeking perspective.
Stein proposes a number of principles that both explain and jus-
tify the rules found in evidence law, and these principles work to serve
the error allocation function. The "principle of maximal individuali-
zation" prevents factfinders from making a decision against a party
when the evidence they have to work with is not subject to individual-
ized testing. 354
 This principle is said to have broad application, al-
though, like most principles, it can be trumped by other values. Three
served actions and decisions will continue in the future. Reliance on statistical
generalizations in forecasting human actions may prove perilous: recall Ber-
trand Russell's (in)famous chicken, conditioned to expect its daily feeding
until the day the farmer interrupted this routine by butchering it for meat.
One can make predictions about human actions only within some theoretical
framework that imposes order on the empirically gathered facts. Generaliza-
tions about human actions acquire plausibility only by virtue of some explana-
tory theory that connects actions to reasons. Theoretical lenses may be micro-
scopic or macroscopic, depending on the desired level of abstraction. In a
search for a causal mechanism that explains numerous actions by their under-
lying motivations, theoretical lenses must be at a relatively high level of ab-
straction. This form of reductionism is necessary to tame "wild facts" and is,
therefore, intrinsic to behavioral modeling. The compromised accuracy re-
sulting from this reductionism is the price that any behavioral theory (and,
perhaps, any theory) exacts in order to attain determinacy.
Seidmann Be Stein, supra note 333, at 436-37 (citations omitted). Of course this is no dif-
ferent from most legal scholarship, and it would be unfair to lay any special criticism on
the doorstep of Seidmann and Stein.
332 See generally ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005). Stein, not surpris-
ingly, has developed these ideas over time. See generally Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make
a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined ECOTEDMiCAStification, 79 Mx. L.
REV. 1199 (2001); Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CANADIAN .). L. & JURIS-
PRUDENCE 279 (1996).
553 STEIN, supra note 352, at 118-40.
554 Id. at 100. Readers will recognize in this a justification for holding "naked statistical
evidence" to be inadmissible or insufficient, See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying
text.
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other principles guide the construction of rules that allocate the risk
of error. The "cost-efficiency principle," which applies in all litigation,
requires that factfinders minimize the total cost of errors and error-
avoidance. 355
 The "equality principle" applies in civil litigation and
posits that fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce
unequal apportionment of the risk of error between parties. 556 The
"equal best principle," which applies in criminal trials, requires that to
justifiably convict a defendant the state must make its best efforts to
protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must
not provide better protection to other individuals. 557
Although Stein presents these ideas as a break from evidence law
and the ostensible goals of evidence doctrine, it seems to us that his
ideas are more a complement than an alternative to most existing
theory. Rules that allocate the risk of making erroneous decisions are
closer cousins of rules designed to enhance truth finding than Stein
realizes. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any sophisticated system for
seeking correct answers that is not at the same time concerned with
allocation of the risk of error. Perhaps the best and most obvious
analogy is to hypothesis testing in science: the rules for determining
whether to reject a null hypothesis (in the pursuit of empirical truth)
take fully into account the risk of erroneous rejection of true null hy-
potheses and erroneous failure to reject false null hypotheses. The
risks of the two types of error are balanced in a manner that reflects
the costs and harms associated with one type versus the other. 358 In
science, and, we believe, in trials, fact finding under conditions of un-
certainty and the allocation of the risk of error work happily together
hand in glove.
What we've seen so far in the law and economics contributions to
evidence scholarship is usually a strong version of rational choice the-
ory. But since evidence scholars are usually alert to the nonrational
limitations of human reasoning, why not explore a weaker version of
rational choice? Why not something like the bounded rationality of
behavioral law and economics? 556 Perhaps that will be the next turn.
355 STEIN, supra note 352, at 136-37.
356 Id. at 217-18.
357 Id. at 172-78.
395 See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Statistical Proof in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 102, at ch. 5. One can alternatively refer to any textbook on inferen-
tial statistics in any field that uses statistics.
559 Set. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. then, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,1055-59 (2000).
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CONCLUSION
In large part, the factors that influence the mix of doctrinal and
interdisciplinary scholarship on evidence are similar to those that af-
fect that mix in other fields. As in other legal fields, a variety of obsta-
cles to interdisciplinary work exists. Consider first the category of
quantitative empirical research, which in the case of evidence law of-
ten means research on law and psychology. Law professors have no
training in empirical research and analysis. Even if they did, they do
not have students who are in a position to assist in carrying out such
research. Even if those problems can be surmounted, there are daunt-
ing funding problems, aggravated by the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has not seen funding of research for the improvement of law
as a high priority.m4
 The traditions of single authorship and of grand
theory scholarship also militate against empirical work.mi Empirical
research does not suit the scholarly habits of many law professors who
rarely venture beyond the law library, and now, with so many re-
sources online, need not even leave their offices. 362
Changes in law schools can help reduce these obstacles. 563 One of
the most notable developments is the seemingly steady increase in the
number of scholars joining the ranks of the legal academy who are
educated in disciplines in addition to law, as well as having training in
empirical research. For others, law schools could do more to support
training of law professors in the needed methodological skills, encour-
aging them to attend research institutes or take needed courses.
Changes in the way manuscripts are reviewed by law journals, for ex-
660 Federal funding agencies such as the State Justice Institute and the National Insti-
tute ofJustice seldom have the funding of research on evidence law on their agendas. The
National Science Foundation, however, has been more supportive of such work.
"1 Professor Lawrence Friedman has written:
To begin with, empirical research is hard work, and lots of it; it is also nonli-
brary research, and many law teachers are afraid of it it calls for skills that
most law teachers do not have; if it is at all elaborate, it is team research, and
law teachers are not used to this kind of effort; often it requires hustling grant
money from foundations or government agencies, and law teachers simply do
not know how to do that....
Prestige is a factor, too. Law schools ... tend to exalt "theory" over applied
research. Empirical research has an applied air to it, compared to legal the-
ory."
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 774 (1986).
562
 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
5t15 For suggestions along the lines described in this paragraph, see generally Lee Ep-
stein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Ctn. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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ample by adding an element of blind peer review by faculty members,
might encourage careful empirical research. The tradition of single
authorship needs to be changed, encouraging legal scholars to collabo-
rate with colleagues in other departments. In the field of evidence, col-
laboration is eased by the fact that the evidence scholar's concern with
the accuracy of witnesses and factfinders overlaps with the psycholo-
gist's interest in memory, perception, and human reasoning.
Lempert raises a more specific methodological concern about
empirical research in the field of evidence: "With the exception of
some psychologists, few scholars have attempted to shed an empirical
light on evidentiary issues. One reason for our lack of empirical
knowledge is that it is hard to study the effects of evidence rules out-
side the laboratory, and laboratory studies raise substantial external
validity problems." 364 Whether the issue of generalizability is greater
here than in other kinds of simulation research is not clean And the
problem sometimes exists and sometimes does not exist. It seems to
us that numerous research questions can be studied without running
into very serious questions of generalizability. It is difficult to see why
laboratory studies of sequential and simultaneous lineups would not
be generalizable to legal situations. One also can do simulation stud-
ies about how, for example, people reason about evidence, such as
Thompson and Schumann's studies of the prosecutor's fallacy and the
defense attorney's fallacy, 365 or Koehler's experiments on how people
reason about probability. 366 Where the question is generalizability
from the research participants, when the task is one requiring intel-
lect and it is failed by undergraduates, one would think the failure
results would generalize to lay juries. Other times, experiments can
and have been done using jurors. In addition, one can do field studies
on how juries reason about evidence. One example is a study of jury
deliberations by Diamond and Vidmar in which they found, by re-
cording the deliberations, that jurors did not talk about using insur-
ance coverage to find deep pockets, but rather they talked about
whether the plaintiff had insurance that would provide a collateral
source for compensation. 567 On the other hand, as our assessment of
the hearsay studies indicates, sometimes it is very difficult to mirror
364 Lempert, supra note 2, at 1709 (citation omitted).
363 See generally Thompson & Schumann, supra note 221.
366 See, e.g., Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 164; Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Per-
suaded by DNA Match Statistics? 15 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 493 (2001).
367 Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 7bpic,s,
87 VA. L. Ray. 1857, 1888-89 (2001).
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the legal situation in laboratory studies. The use of qualitative infor-
mation and fireside inductions always will be important in assessing
evidence law. It is dangerous to generalize about generalizability; the
devil is in the details, or in the particular subject being studied.
Interdisciplinary scholarship on forensic science is a particularly
promising (if difficult) field. Work on forensic science topics is more
challenging than much of the work on law and psychology, because of
the absence of overlap of legally relevant issues with issues that are
already being studied in other academic disciplines. In many areas,
forensic science expertise has developed without input from the
academy or attention to the scientific method. 368
 This creates obvious
obstacles to research, but also an unmatched opportunity to contrib-
ute by doing something that is not being done elsewhere. Law profes-
sors should become involved, and try to interest experts in other
fields as well. We hope that the development of institutes and centers
will start to address this problem. 569
 If courts heed Daubert's call to
screen expertise for scientific validity, the threat of exclusion of evi-
dence should create an incentive for this type of work.
Scholarship on probability and proof, and on formal aids to draw-
ing accurate inferences, wilt continue to be an important component of
evidence scholarship. Some topics seem to have run (or over-run) their
course, such as the blue bus and gatecrasher problems. Topics involv-
ing the study of inference and decision making have unrealized poten-
tial and will probably continue to be growth areas. For example, one
can expect to see further efforts to upgrade Wigmorean charting and
further work on computer-aided pretrial fact analysis. Bayes will live on,
both as art aid in thinking about evidence law and, among Bayesian en-
thusiasts, as a tool in fact analysis. But, because the decisions of humans
(jurors and judges) are not well explained or predicted by Bayesian
approaches, watch for the further incorporation of cognitive science
and the arrival of artificial intelligence into these projects—to the ex-
tent that these new sciences provide more accurate predictions of how
judges will rule and how jurors will infer. At the same time, we are
unlikely to see Bayes' Theorem in trials themselves, where many items
of evidence are involved and an expert would have to explain to the
factfinder how to apply the theory.
369 See supra notes 146-163 and accompanying text.
Ng For example, one development in progress is the creation of an Institute for Stud-
ies in Science and Law," which would bring together ideas for needed research, research-
ers who could carry out the research, and funding for the research. See Inst. for Studies in
Sci. and Law, Purpose Statement (Sept., 11, 2005) (on file with the authors).
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Interest in evidence and feminism will continue and grow to the
same extent that an intellectual tradition regarded as distinctly femi-
nist continues and grows. It may tend to concentrate on areas of evi-
dence that are of special concern to women (sexual assault, obvi-
ously), but moving beyond those limited areas will be useful to both
the scholars and to the law of evidence. There certainly is no reason
why evidence law should not be as susceptible to continued feminist
analysis as it is to analysis through the lens of any other field. In some
ways, feminist legal analysis has the same advantage that traditional
legal analysis had, namely, that it is an armchair activity that can be
carried on by taking a set of ideas and using them as a lens with which
to examine the law.
Law and economics scholarship on evidence will continue to be a
presence in leading law reviews. It is possible that evidence law will
not attract as much funding as in other areas of law and economics
legal scholarship because it is not as obvious a fit with the political
agenda of funders," but theoretical law and economics scholarship
does not require any more funding than doctrinal scholarship, and
elite journals are fond of it. Moreover, it need not be as time-
consuming as empirical research, since the theorist can take a body of
ideas and apply them to one legal topic after another.
Although we welcome interdisciplinary scholarship in general,
we also see some unsettling elements. First, it sometimes exalts politi-
cal and substantive concerns over the goal of accuracy. Second, it
sometimes seeks or postulates implausible extrinsic effects.
The first of these concerns applies to feminist scholarship that, for
example, argues for admission of battered woman's syndrome expert
testimony. Some of the writing in the field seems to regard the results
57 Expressing this view, Richard Lempert writes:
[M]ajor funders of law and economics seem to have a pro-business, anti-
regulation, and/or generally conservative political agenda they wish to pro-
mote. Although the Olin Foundation's support of intellectual activities
that promote no coherent social agenda are contrary to my hypothesis, I still
do not believe that evidence law will be a high priority for support among law
and economics research funders. Not only does evidence law not deal with is-
sues that are at the core of what funders hope to establish through economic
research, but, as Posner points out, when the lamp of economics shines on
evidence law, what it reveals is not necessarily compatible with conservative or
big business political agendas. Posner, for example, argues that a law and
economics perspective supports the institution of jury trial, a message that
business supporters of law and economics are unlikely to relish.
Lempert, supra note 2, at 1657-38 (citations omitted).
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that this admission would bring—favoring women defendants in mur-
der cases, for example—as trumping concerns about the accuracy of
the expertise admitted. And, to the extent that feminist scholars are
influenced by post-modern epistemology, this might cause them to be
fact-skeptics or to privilege anecdotal evidence—narratives—over more
thorough, complete, critical, and systematic (in a word, scientific) evi-
dence.
There is nothing illogical about preferring a substantive agenda
to a procedural agenda. In the field of evidence, however, this posture
is likely to be dangerous and self-defeating. First, there is no way to
ensure that a politicized approach can be confined to feminist is-
sues."' Taking such an approach would require either openly subor-
dinating the goal of accuracy or secretly implementing another goal
while adhering to the rhetoric of pursuing the truth. Both approaches
have disadvantages. It is unlikely that establishing a practice of secretly
distorting evidence law in pursuit of substantive agendas will work in
the long run to protect those whom society otherwise victimizes; after
all, judges come from the dominant group and share its prejudices
and interests. And, of course, there is a great danger of getting
caught. The open pursuit of substantive goals also invites imitation in
other areas, and sacrifices one important way in which evidence law
can promote equality. An avowed and honest pursuit of accuracy has
the advantage of cutting both ways, helping the powerful in one case
and the disadvantaged in another. 572
Our concern about pursuing substantive effects also applies to law
and economics scholarship, with the added twist that some of the sub-
stantive effects that have been posited seem implausible. With its strong
interest in incentives, law and economics scholarship may be particu-
371
 For a reluctant endorsement of the idea of recognizing that the acceptance of BIAS
is frankly political, accompanied by expression of wishes that this approach can be cab-
ined, see Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Thais and Evidence Law, 46
DUKE L.J. 461, 509-16 (1996). Professor Mosteller's reservations about his own proposal
are a good summary of our reasons for disagreeing with him. Id.
272
 For a prominent example: Daubert as doctrine advances the interests of rich civil de-
fendants as well as indigent criminal defendants in avoiding having junky science used
against them in court. In applying Daubert, judges may not be so evenhanded but instead
scrutinize the offerings of civil plaintiffs more studiously than they scrutinize the offerings
of government prosecutors; such judges are subject to serious criticism for their willful
disregard of the law. See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Stan-
dards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALn. L. REV. 99, 104-12 (2000). Also, compare
the reviews of case law relating to expert evidence usually associated with civil cases to that
usually associated with criminal cases, in the various chapters of MODERN SCIENTIFIC Evt-
DENCE, supra note 102.
2006]	 Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered 	 1029
lady vulnerable to this flaw. When your tool is a hammer, everything
looks like a nail. As long as law and economics scholarship looks for the
ways in which evidence rules shape everyday societal behavior, and dis-
regards the truth-finding aspects of evidence rules, it risks overlooking
core concerns in favor of chasing epiphenomena. While we do not
agree that evidence-related law and economics is necessarily "common
sense on stilts, "375 we do think that evidence scholars already are quite
adept at imagining the possible effects of evidence rules without any
training in economics. What is needed is empirical validation, not in-
creasingly ingenious and speculative hypotheses about what the extrin-
sic effects of evidence rules might be. There are plenty of good hy-
potheses that are in need of testing, and inventing clever new ones that
no one has thought of before should, all else equal, have lower priority
than trying to validate plausible old ones.
We recognize that one cannot predict with assurance the future
path of law and economics evidence scholarship based on what has
appeared so far, and we have no desire to "strangle the infant in its
crib. " 574 Moreover, we recognize that, in other fields, predictions that
law and economics scholarship would level off or die out have proven
to be wrong, or at least premature. 375 Nonetheless, we think that the
scholarship so far too often has shown a proclivity toward having fun
by tracing out the implications of models, regardless of what other
sources of knowledge might say about the plausibility of the models or
the deduced effects.
Interdisciplinary scholarship that has the objective of improving
fact finding is an obvious boon for evidence scholars. In this category
we place scholarship that deals with probability and proof, with hu-
man psychology and human reasoning, with the scientific method
and forensic science. Interdisciplinary scholarship that pursues other
objectives is a less obvious match. To the extent that feminist scholar-
ship pursues substantive objectives, it would do better to direct those
efforts at changing the substantive law, rather than at addressing
problems indirectly by changing (and perhaps distorting) evidence
373 Lempert, supra note 2, at 1619. Also see Posner's response, supra note 2.
374 See Posner, supra note 2, at 1721.
375 See id. at 1714 (citing Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 245
(1989) ("[L]aw and economics ... seems to have peaked."); Morton J. Horwitz, law and
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 14ors-raA L. REV. 905, 905 (1980) ("I have the strong feeling
that the economic analysis of law has 'peaked out' as the latest fad in legal scholarship.")).
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law."6
 To the extent that law and economics scholarship posits a
strong incentive effect of rules that purport merely to seek accuracy,
few will find such arguments plausible. To the extent that it seeks this
effect through the reform of evidence law, we worry that its influence
will be harmful, leading evidence law away from the important mis-
sion of producing accurate verdicts.
Whether accuracy should be the primary objective of evidence
law is a topic that could support an article twice as long as this one.
Other general goals, such as satisfaction of the parties or catharsis, are
at least plausible, and in particular contexts goals such as the protec-
tion of privacy or encouraging beneficial out-of-court conduct are
paramount. But, as a general matter, it is hard to understand how a
society can follow the rule of law in the absence of accurate fact find-
ing. In pursuit of these purposes, one needs to have in mind goals for
evidence law and evidence scholarship. We argue that the main,
though certainly not the only, goal for evidence law is to promote ac-
curacy in fact finding. Accuracy is essential to accomplishing the goals
of substantive law. For the substantive law to work, the fact-finding
mechanism must be accurate enough to enforce its prohibitions and
dispense its rewards. While one should not be unduly optimistic about
the goal of accuracy, one should also avoid extreme cynicism. There is
no good reason to believe that the goal of accuracy ultimately will be
undermined by the self-serving conduct of actors in the system. After
all, those powerful enough to create the substantive law are motivated
to make sure that it is enforced effectively, so accuracy in fact finding
should in general have a powerful constituency. Any goal of accom-
plishing something else (such as pretending to be accurate while not
actually being so) is likely to be self-defeating because the deception
inevitably will be discovered. 377
It is a heady task to make prescriptive statements about the direc-
tion of evidence scholarship, because there is so little general agree-
ment about what constitutes good scholarship. The dispute about the
use of fiction in scholarship in other fields is only one example of the
373
 if the goal is to provide an escape from criminal liability for women who kill their
abusers, the better way to accomplish that is to change the substantive law of self defense
to insulate such persons from liability in appropriately defined circumstances, not to
squeeze questionable expertise in through the evidence rules. Doing that weakens the
evidence rules, invites backfire (as similarly questionable expertise is used against women),
and might offer only temporary protection (as the experts change their own views over
time). See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE
LAW 74 (1999); Faigman, supra note 268, at 643-47.
3" See generally Nesson, supra note 233.
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divergence of views. 378
 There is little agreement upon basic premises,
such as whether scholarship should be useful. 379 Evidence scholarship
has many purposes, but surely one worthwhile purpose is to improve
the accuracy of verdicts. Traditional doctrinal scholarship aimed at
this goal by improving evidence law, for example by eliminating
anomalies and obstacles to rational proof. The "New Evidence Schol-
arship" on probability and proof represented a turn from reasoning
about evidence law to reasoning about evidence facts. With William
Twining's influential approval,m scholars became interested in how
formal methods might be used as an aid in drawing inferences and
finding facts. 381 We think that it is even more exciting to contemplate
scholarship—like that done on eyewitness memory and on forensic
science—that aims at improving the evidence facts themselves by in-
fluencing the way in which evidence is generated.
37" See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL As-
SAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 95-117 (1997).
379 "[Ole scholar seeks knowledge for its own sake, not for some further purpose, al-
though the knowledge he acquires may be instrumentally useful for other ends? Anthony
T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 967-68
(1981).
315° See TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 12-31,
341-72.
"1 See generally C.G.G. AITKEN, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FO-
RENSIC SCIENTISTS (1995); ROBERTSON 8c VIGNAUX, supra note 206; DAVID A. SCRUM, THE
EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING (1994).
